Petition

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No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE LOCAL NO. 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

JOSEF EGGLESTON, ALBERTO VIERA, EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, and IVOR TAYLOR,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether a charging party's failure to name one of several parties as a respondent in a timely charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to § 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) deprives the federal district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the charging party's subsequent Title VII lawsuit against the party not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge.

2. Whether this Court's holdings recognizing the broad authority of the district court to control and sanction discovery abuses must be given full force in alleged class employment discrimination cases.

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* Two additional parties not named in the case caption are Plumbing Contractors Association of Chicago and Cook County and the Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local 130, U.A., who will file separately for a Writ of Certiorari.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE LOCAL NO. 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

JOSEF EGGLESTON, ALBERTO VIERA, EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, and IVOR TAYLOR,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Joint Apprenticeship Committee Local No. 130, U.A., respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered on August 11, 1981.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is officially reported at 657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981) and is reproduced at Appendix A. The order denying the petition for rehearing is also reproduced at Appendix A.

The district court orders of November 19, 1979 and April 17, 1980 dismissing the claims of respondents are not officially reported and appear at Appendix A. The district

court order dismissing all Title VII claims against petitioner is reported at 452 F.Supp. 1127 (N.D.Ill. 1978) and, therefore, is not reproduced here. The December 19, 1979 order on class discovery is officially published at 77 F.R.D. 399 (N.D.Ill. 1977) and is also not reproduced.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered August 11, 1981. A timely petition for rehearing *in banc* was denied on October 7, 1981, and this petition was filed within ninety days of that date. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

(See Appendix B)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e);

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-f(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Joint Apprenticeship Committee, Local No. 130, U.A. (JAC) is one of three petitioners in this case. The Plumbing Contractors Association of Chicago and Cook County (PCA), an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and Chicago Journeyman Plumbers, Local Union No. 130, U.A., (Local 130), a labor organization established under the National Labor Relations Act, will file separately in this case. Petitioner JAC is a trust fund organized and administered under the Taft-Hartley Act. Its trustees are appointed by both labor and management, and among its labor representatives are officers of Local 130. Petitioner operates a federally-approved program for the education and training of apprentice plumbers.

The five individual respondents instituted a purported class action in district court against petitioner, PCA and Local 130. Respondents alleged that blacks and hispanics were denied entrance into the Chicagoland plumbing industry in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.*) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981). Respondents invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201 and 2202 and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

Dismissal of Title VII Claims Against JAC

Petitioner JAC moved to dismiss all Title VII claims against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not named in a timely charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. Under § 706(e) and (f)(1) of Title VII, a lawsuit may only be brought against "the respondent named in [an EEOC] charge" filed within 180 days of the alleged unfair employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1). On October 28, 1975, Hayward Rose filed his initial charge with the EEOC naming only Local 130 as respondent. The charge stated:

> I have been denied entrance into the plumbers' union because of my race, Black. I was told on 8/12/75 that they were not taking any new apprentices. For the last 14 years they have denied me entrance.

The EEOC neither formally nor informally notified JAC of the charge. On March 9, 1977, exactly 556 days after the alleged unfair employment practice, Rose filed an amended charge with the EEOC. For the first time, Rose named JAC as a respondent. The amended charge again listed August 21, 1975 as the latest date of discrimination and read:

> I have been denied an opportunity to obtain a status of journeyman plumber and entrance into the Plumbers

> Union because of my race. The last time I applied was on August 21, 1975. I had also applied on numerous occasions during the past 14 years. During the same period, I have also applied for entrance into the Apprenticeship Program. I was repeatedly given the runaround until August 21, 1975 when I was advised that they were not taking any new Apprentices.

No other party filed an EEOC charge against JAC, but all parties sued JAC under Title VII.

The district court dismissed all Title VII claims against JAC, 452 F.Supp. 1127, 1132-36. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal. The court held that notwithstanding the statutory language of Title VII, the failure to name a party in a timely EEOC charge will not deprive the court of jurisdiction under Title VII where the unnamed party either knew or should have known of the EEOC charge and thus had an opportunity to participate in the administrative proceedings (A. 35). The court found that the interests of JAC were substantially similar (though not identical) to the interests of Local 130 and, therefore, JAC had both reasonable notice of the charge through the notice given to Local 130 and an opportunity to conciliate. The court also found that since Local 130 failed to conciliate, "the addition of the JAC to the conciliation effort would have made little if any difference" (A. 36).

Sanctions For Respondents' Refusal to Give Discovery

In July, 1977, over respondents' objections, the district court bifurcated discovery between class and merits issues. Noting that an overlap might occur, the court ordered the parties to answer merits discovery reasonably calculated to disclose information relevant to the class issues.

In September, 1978, the depositions of respondents commenced on the class issues. All petitioners encountered great

difficulty in obtaining requested information on those issues. Respondents refused to answer hundreds of questions. Respondents later contended that the questions were racially harassing, embarrassing or irrelevant. Two respondents terminated their depositions and refused to complete them.

On five occasions between September, 1978 and April, 1979, petitioners advised the court of the discovery problems. The court admonished the parties to proceed expeditiously and threatened sanctions for failure to comply with its orders. At no time did respondents' counsel seek a protective order or contend that respondents had been harassed or otherwise improperly questioned.

Following petitioners' unsuccessful attempt to obtain compliance through a discovery conference, all petitioners filed motions to compel discovery and for sanctions, and respondents filed a cross motion for sanctions and objections to petitioners' motions. During the pendency of petitioners' motions, respondents did not offer to respond to any of the disputed discovery, even though the court continued to urge compromise.

On November 19, 1979, the district court granted petitioners' motions and denied respondents' motion (A. 42-60). The court found that respondents Eggleston and Viera improperly terminated their depositions without first obtaining a protective order; that respondents improperly refused to answer hundreds of specific questions on the advice of counsel or their own initiative and foreclosed any inquiry in many areas in advance of questioning; that respondents and their attorneys improperly engaged in an estimated 127 off-the-record conferences, many of which were initiated while a question was pending; and that respondents' counsel improperly refused to provide information regarding the ability of one respondent to speak

English, thereby causing the waste of an entire day of deposition. The court dismissed the claims of respondents Eggleston and Viera pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 for terminating their depositions, and it entered a rule to show cause why the claims of the remaining respondents should not be dismissed for their "evasive and thwarting conduct."

During the pendency of the rule, respondents did not tender the refused discovery, but instead filed a motion for recusal. On April 17, 1980, the court dismissed the claims of the remaining respondents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. (A. 61-78)

The court of appeals reversed the dismissals. Noting that the district court decision was carefully explained in reasoned opinions, the court of appeals sustained the district court's findings regarding the misconduct of respondents and their counsel. The court of appeals additionally noted that respondents themselves were guilty of "obstructive tactics" and that their counsel both provoked many discovery controversies and demonstrated little willingness to resolve problems (A. 22-25). However, the court reversed the dismissals because the district court should have placed greater emphasis on petitioners' alleged discovery misconduct.

The court stated:

> Ordinarily we would condone the use of appropriate sanctions when attorneys forsake their professional responsibilities, but in this discrimination case the sanctions fall too heavily upon the individual plaintiffs who were not knowledgeable in the ways of the law, as well as on the other putative members of the class they seek to assist. Members of the putative class, knowing of this present ordeal, could not but be discouraged from instituting similar individual undertakings against these defendants. If there is any merit

> to the charges of discrimination against minorities by those who control the plumbing trade in the Chicago area, then, too, the dismissal sanction rests too heavily upon the public.

(A. 29).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

THE DECISION BELOW IMPROPERLY EXPANDS FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN TITLE VII CASES.

A. The Court's Relaxation Of The Title VII Jurisdictional Requirements Raises Numerous Problems And Questions Affecting Jurisdictional Determinations Under Title VII.

This case presents an important question concerning the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction in Title VII lawsuits. This Court has not squarely addressed the issue, but it has intimated an answer contrary to the seventh circuit's holding. Title VII "specifies with precision the jurisdictional prerequisites that an individual must satisfy before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit." *Alexander* v. *Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). Accord: *United Air Lines, Inc.* v. *Evans*, 431 U.S. 553, 555 n.4 (1977); *McDonnell Douglas Corp.* v. *Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). Under § 706 of Title VII, a party must:

> (a) file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unfair employment practice; and
>
> (b) bring an action in district court *"against the respondent named in the charge"* within 90 days of notice of the right to sue.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) (emphasis supplied). Since the statute itself specifically lists the exceptions to the general rule, it should not be judicially relaxed. *Inter-*

national Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. *Robbins & Myers, Inc.*, 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).

The seventh circuit has broadly expanded Title VII subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which a defendant was not named as a respondent in a timely EEOC charge. The court held that if an unnamed party knew or should have known of the charge and thus had an opportunity to conciliate before the EEOC, it may be sued under Title VII (A. 35).

The decision automatically injects into Title VII jurisdictional disputes a question regarding the factual adequacy of notice to the unnamed party. The court's failure to proffer any minimum standards will lead to inconsistent and unpredictable determinations. In this case, the court found that the content of the charge provided adequate notice to JAC even though the charge did not mention JAC nor indicate that the charging party ever dealt with JAC. Thus, the decision indicates that mere knowledge of a *possible* EEOC claim is adequate notice for jurisdictional purposes. It allows vague statements to stand as requisite notice, and it forces an unnamed party to determine for itself its possible involvement before the EEOC.

The decision also creates problems regarding the sufficiency of notice. Section 706(e) contemplates that the EEOC shall notify the charged party within ten days after the charge is filed [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); *Occidental Life Insurance Co.* v. *EEOC*, 432 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1977)], and petitioner was not notified by the EEOC. However, the court found notice sufficient because some officers of Local 130, the party to whom the charge was directed, were also members of JAC (A. 34). The decision may well stand for the proposition that notice received from any unofficial source, e.g., a third party or a newspaper, will be sufficient.

The decision invites the erosion of the fundamental safeguards to which any party subject to liability is entitled.

In finding that an unnamed party may nonetheless be deemed to have sufficient opportunity to conciliate before the EEOC, the decision calls into question the function of the EEOC charge respecting the statutory goal of conciliation. The EEOC charge is designed to formerly initiate a legally-presentable controversy between parties. Until a party is notified that it has been named in a charge, it has no reason to believe that it is involved in a legal controversy and, therefore, no reason to attempt conciliation. However, under the decision below, a party not named in a charge nor notified that it is under EEOC inquiry must initiate a controversy by intervening in the EEOC proceeding in an attempt to conciliate.

Moreover, the decision raises a fundamental issue respecting the duty of an unnamed party to subject itself to a Title VII lawsuit. The Title VII remedial machinery is not limited to the EEOC conciliation conference, and a dissatisfied complainant may bring suit in federal court—provided that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Notably, the seventh circuit has previously held that subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII exists where an unnamed party voluntarily appears before the EEOC. *Davis* v. *Weidner*, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979). Under the decision below, an unnamed party must either voluntarily appear or be deemed to have had sufficient opportunity for purposes of Title VII subject matter jurisdiction. Ironically, in the hope of avoiding litigation, the unnamed party will be forced to intervene before the EEOC—and thereby provide the jurisdictional basis for Title VII litigation. The notion is abhorrent to the American system of jurisprudence, and it is highly questionable that Congress, in creating the remedial mechanism of Title VII, ever intended such a result.

The seventh circuit's finding that JAC had sufficient opportunity to conciliate in light of Local 130's actions before the EEOC (A. 36) stands at odds with recent pronouncements of this Court. In *NLRB* v. *Amax Coal Co.*, —U.S.—, 69 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981), this Court held that although a trustee of a trust fund created under the Taft-Hartley Act is appointed by labor or management, the trustee must maintain undivided loyalty to the fund and may not represent the interest of the party which appointed him. *Id.* at 680-81. Thus, it was improper to impute Local 130's conciliation posture onto JAC. From a broader perspective, the decision raises the question of whether a party may be bound by the failure of an independent party to conciliate.

As this Court stated in *Mohasco Corp.* v. *Silver*, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980):

> . . . in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by legislation is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of law.

The court's expansion of subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII creates more problems than it solves, and its decision should be reviewed by this Court.

B. A Conflict Exists Among Circuit Decisions

The conflict in circuit decisions on the jurisdictional issue further supports the granting of the writ. The fourth circuit has held that the failure to name a party in a timely EEOC charge defeats the assertion of Title VII subject matter jurisdiction. *Mickel* v. *State Employment Service*, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967). Other circuits have refused to follow the language of § 706 and have extended Title VII jurisdiction over an unnamed party. *Glus* v. *G. C. Murphy Co.*, 562 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1977); *Terrell* v. *United States Pipe & Foundry Co.*, 644 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981); *Kaplan* v.

International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975); *Romero* v. *Union P.R.R.*, 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).

Notably, the decisions expanding jurisdiction display a marked diversity of analysis. The seventh circuit carved an exception where a party knew or should have known of a charge and had an opportunity to conciliate. It also considered, without expressly adopting, the third circuit's criteria in *Glus*: (1) whether the charging party could have reasonably determined the role of the unnamed party at the time the EEOC charge was filed; (2) whether the interests of the named and unnamed party were so similar that the latter's inclusion in EEOC proceedings was unnecessary; (3) whether the unnamed party was prejudiced by the omission; and (4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented that its relationship with complainant is through the named party. 562 F.2d 880, 888. The tenth circuit's approach is similar. 615 F.2d 1303.

The fifth circuit has taken a different approach to the issue. It examined the scope of the charge to determine whether an EEOC investigation of the unnamed party could reasonably grow out of the charge. In affirming the dismissal of an unnamed party, the court found the charge so unspecific that the unnamed party did not even get informal notice of the charge from the EEOC. 644 F.2d 1112, 1124. Under this reasoning, the Title VII action against petitioner JAC was properly dismissed by the district court.

While the ninth circuit also examined the scope of the charge, its reasoning significantly differs from the fifth circuit analysis. Finding the charge sufficiently broad, it held that Title VII subject matter jurisdiction existed even in the absence of evidence that the unnamed party ever re-

ceived notice of the EEOC charge. 525 F.2d 1354, 1358-59. Yet, even the liberal analysis adopted by the seventh circuit considers the issue of notice to the unnamed party

An important jurisdictional question of truly national scope should be resolved by means of an unvarying standard. In light of the divergence between circuits, this case merits review.

II.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S HOLDINGS REGARDING THE AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO SANCTION DISCOVERY ABUSES.

The court of appeal's decision is a study in contradictions. The court agreed with the district court's findings that respondents had improperly refused to answer hundreds of deposition questions neither dealing with privileged information nor covered by a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); that respondents' counsel improperly engaged in numerous off-the-record conferences with their clients while deposition questions were pending; that respondents' counsel improperly instructed their clients to terminate answers when counsel felt enough had been said; that many of respondents' answers were evasive; that the depositions of two respondents were unilaterally aborted and that they improperly refused to complete the depositions, even though JAC had not asked a single question to either deponent; and that respondents' counsel provoked many of the discovery abuses and demonstrated little willingness to conciliate disputes (A. 22-25).

Nonetheless it reversed the district court for failure to give sufficient weight to petitioners' alleged misconduct (A. 30). Curiously, it reached this decision even after

finding that respondents' complaints of misconduct were not fully or timely raised in the district court (A. 28-29).

The court of appeals decision squarely conflicts with this Court's dictates in *National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.*, 427 U.S. 639 (1976). A court of appeals may not substitute its own judgment for that of the district court, nor may it give greater or lesser weight to the findings made by the district court. *Id.* at 641-42. It may only reverse the district court for an abuse of discretion. *Id.* at 642. The court of appeals paid mere lip service to this rule, clearly reviewing the record *de novo*.

In justifying its decision, the court stated:

> Ordinarily we would condone the use of appropriate sanctions when attorneys forsake their professional responsibilities, but in this discrimination case the sanctions fall too heavily upon the individual plaintiffs who were not knowledgeable in the ways of the law, as well as on the other putative members of the class they seek to assist. Members of the putative class, knowing of this present ordeal, could not but be discouraged from instituting similar individual undertakings against these defendants. If there is any merit to the charges of discrimination against minorities by those who control the plumbing trade in the Chicago area, then, too, the dismissal sanction rests too heavily upon the public.

(A. 29). The court's concerns are unjustifiable. Nothing in *National Hockey League*, Title VII, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 warrants the favored treatment of recalcitrant litigants who claim employment discrimination. *Roadway Express* v. *Piper*, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64, (1980) counsels against such treatment:

> Rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently both 'to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, [and] to deter those who might be

> tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterent.' *National Hockey League* v. *Metropolitan Hockey Club*, [427 U.S.] at 643.

Other putative class members will be discouraged from bringing suit only if they intend to employ the same obstructive tactics that respondents used here. Legitimate claims and the rights of the public are adequately protected by the district court's decision. See, *Johnson* v. *Railway Express Agency*, 421 U.S. 454, 467 n. 13 (1975).

Also unjustified was the court's pardon of respondents for their counsels' misconduct. This Court clearly held in *Link* v. *Wabash R.R.*, 370 U.S. 626 (1962) that parties must bear full responsibility for their attorneys' misconduct. A contrary rule will lead to just the kind of abuse which the district court so correctly stopped.

The decision here ignores the teachings of this Court and thereby seriously erodes the district court's authority to preserve the orderly and efficient conduct of litigation in all civil cases.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Honorable Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the seventh circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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Appendix

APPENDIX A

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 80-1008

JOSEF EGGLESTON and ALBERT VIERA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CHICAGO JOURNEYMEN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION No. 130, U.A., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 80-1650

EDELL PLUMMER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CHICAGO JOURNEYMEN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION No. 130, U.A., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 77-C-1726—Edwin A. Robson, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 10, 1981—DECIDED AUGUST 11, 1981

Before FAIRCHILD and WOOD, *Circuit Judges*, and HOFFMAN, *Senior District Judge.**

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* The Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Senior District Judge of the Eastern District of Virginia, is sitting by designation.

WOOD, *Circuit Judge*. This began as a not uncommon civil rights suit against a local union and a contractors association. It was brought by five named plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of black and Hispanic persons alleging employment discrimination in their efforts to gain entry into the plumbing trade.[1] Controversy quickly erupted between attorneys over mutual discovery efforts which had been limited by the court to class certification issues. Although the complaint was filed in 1977 and was followed by voluminous interrogatories and in excess of 2,600 pages of deposition transcript, the case is before us now with the class issue still unresolved. The trial judge assessed all the fault against counsel for plaintiffs and dismissed the entire suit with prejudice. This appeal followed.

I.

A resolution of the controversy on the merits, the legitimate controversy between the litigants, not the lawyers, is nowhere in sight.[2] We regret that this court must review this type of dispute, because the conduct of this case reveals an abuse of the judicial processes which does a disservice not only to the court and litigants, but also to the public interest in the fair and efficient resolution of disputes.[3]

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[1] The complaint alleges violations of both Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.*, and Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. One minor issue concerning the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII claim against one defendant will be addressed in Part II of this opinion, *infra*.

[2] This dispute which festered between counsel, we trust, is an exception to their usual levels of professional competence.

[3] Chief Justice Burger has often alluded to the "misuse and abuse of pretrial judicial process," and did so recently in his

Background

The five named plaintiffs are represented to be either black or Hispanic persons who had applied unsuccessfully for apprentice or journeyman membership in the Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130. Following those failures, each plaintiff allegedly filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and after exhausting that avenue retained counsel and filed suit against the three defendants.

Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 ("Local 130") is alleged to be the labor organization representing all plumbers employed in Cook County, Illinois, and also certain plumbers employed outside the county. Plumbing Contractors Association of Chicago and Cook County ("Contractors Association" or "PCA") is alleged to represent most plumbing contractors within the jurisdiction of Local 130 and to be a co-signatory with Local 130 to a collective bargaining agreement which governs the terms and conditions of employment in the plumbing industry within Local 130's jurisdiction. It is further alleged that the Contractors Association, in consort with Local 130, controls the appren-

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[3] *continued*

Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary delivered to the Mid-Year Meeting of the American Bar Association in Chicago, Illinois, on February 3, 1980. In his year-end Report on the Judiciary, December 29, 1980, the Chief Justice also highlighted the abuse by lawyers of the discovery process as contributing to the unnecessarily high cost of litigation.

For comments on the discovery controversy, *see* Julius B. Levine, *"Abuse" of Discovery; or Hard Work Makes Good Law*, 67 ABA Journal 565 (May 1981). *See also* Judge Milton Pollock, *Discovery —Its Abuse and Correction*, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978); Judge William H. Becker, *Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition*, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978).

ticeship program operated by the Joint Apprenticeship Committee Local No. 130 U.A. ("JAC") which is alleged to be an unincorporated association that is an agent of and operates under the control of Local 130 and the Contractors Association in administering the apprenticeship program. The Committee is directed by a ten-person board, five members selected by the union and five by the Contractors Association.

Plaintiffs contend that substantially all plumbing work in the construction industry in the Chicago metropolitan area is performed under the labor agreement between Local 130 and the Contractors Association. Under the terms of that agreement there are two ways to enter into the plumbing trade and eventually become a "journeyman" plumber. One is to be admitted to the plumbers' apprenticeship program, and the other is to work for five years in the trade and then be recommended by a contractor. This latter procedure, however, first requires a permit from Local 130. At the conclusion of either procedure, the prospective journeyman must pass a test administered by Local 130.

Plaintiffs submit that the defendants have systematically denied admission into the apprentice program to blacks and Hispanics, and in the five-year program, the contractors association has refused to refer blacks and Hispanics to Local 130 to receive the permit necessary to gain the required qualifying experience. In addition to generally excluding blacks and Hispanics, plaintiffs aver that Local 130 has refused to administer the test for journeymen status to blacks and Hispanics and that the test, in any event, is discriminatory and non-valid. It is claimed that each of the named plaintiffs has been rebuffed from pursuing one or the other of the entry programs because of the alleged discrimination.

Discovery Problems

The trial court limited initial discovery to matters relevant to a determination of whether the suit should proceed as a class action.[4] Extensive interrogatories were exchanged, numbering into hundreds of questions and sub-questions. Things did not go smoothly from the outset. A series of motions to compel discovery were filed by each party. The trial judge labored patiently to resolve the questions during a period of months.[5] Next began the oral depositions of the named plaintiffs which lasted about sixteen days before the whole process collapsed. The plaintiffs claim that many questions were racially offensive; were intended to intimidate, harass and belittle plaintiffs; were argumentative, repetitious and obviously outside the knowledge of individual plaintiffs; and were not relevant to class certification issues.

Defendants seek to justify the questions propounded and fault the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel. They cite 965 refusals of the witnesses to answer. Defendants contend that race was a proper subject for inquiry because plaintiffs' complaint made it an issue and failed to identify which plaintiffs were black and which Hispanic. Further, de-

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[4] *Plummer* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local No. 130, U.A.*, 77 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ill. 1977).

[5] The plaintiffs raise as a separate issue what they label as the prejudicial partiality of the trial judge in presiding over all the continuing and bitter discovery wrangles. They claim there came a time when the judge should have recused himself. We summarily dispose of this issue. The bickering of the lawyers which constantly plagued the trial judge would have frustrated an angel. The lawyers have no one to blame except themselves. The trial judge carefully explained his decisions in reasoned memorandums. Whether we agree with all his decisions or not does not reflect adversely upon the impartiality of the trial judge.

fendants argue that the complaint was confusing in that it did not make clear which plaintiffs were alleging racial discrimination and which were alleging national origin discrimination. Defendants additionally aver that plaintiffs failed to object in court to the alleged harassment or to seek protective orders. Defendants also complain that plaintiffs not only refused to answer numerous questions, but that plaintiffs' counsel declared that certain subject matter areas were off limits. Further, it is alleged that plaintiffs' counsel held as least 127 conferences off the record with their clients under circumstances which suggested "coaching" during the course of the deposition testimony. It is claimed that plaintiffs' counsel generally disregarded the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the orders of the court, all of which disrupted the discovery proceedings. Two of the plaintiffs, Eggleston and Viera, it is charged, unilaterally terminated their depositions and refused to appear to complete them. Defendants submit that plaintiffs' counsel did not give accurate information about the necessity of providing an interpreter for Viera. After hours of what is described as futile attempts at examination of Viera, an interpreter was engaged. Later during the deposition Viera became ill and did not complete the deposition. Plaintiffs claim that Viera "collapsed from exhaustion" because of defense counsel's grueling examination.

During his deposition, as an example, Eggleston refused to answer about 200 questions which defendants say were class related and propounded to determine his experience, skill and qualifications to work as a journeyman plumber. Plaintiffs say, however, that the questions were only technical plumbing questions unrelated to class issues and therefore walked out of the deposition offering to return when only class related questions would be asked. Plaintiffs' counsel made it plain that he was not going to submit his clients for opposing counsel's "plumbing test," since

opposing counsel himself "had flunked the legal test so far in this lawsuit," and that plaintiffs' counsel was not prepared "to make him the judge in any plumbing test. . . ." We see no need to set down for posterity all the details of the deposition squabbling. We hope that what has already been briefly mentioned, together with some additional details, will be sufficient to paint the picture for our purposes. As a result, the district court dismissed the claims of Eggleston and Viera and entered a rule to show cause why the three remaining plaintiffs should not also have been dismissed. Five months later, after discovery remained bogged down, the court dismissed the claims of the remaining plaintiffs with prejudice.

Class Action and Discovery Overview

Class actions are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.[6] Plaintiffs seek to bring their class action under Rule 23(a) and

[6] In pertinent part, Rule 23 provides:

(a) *Prerequisites to a Class Action.* One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) *Class Actions Maintainable.* An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(b)(2). Allegations of discrimination do not constitute a by-pass around Rule 23, as the Supreme Court made clear in *East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc.* v. *Rodriguez*, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977):

> We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are typically present. But careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party who has brought

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[6] *continued*

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

> the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination.[7]

Accordingly, some degree of discovery may be appropriate in certain cases to aid making the necessary class determinations. The pleadings are expected to be of assistance, but more information may be needed. *Doctor* v. *Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.*, 540 F.2d 699, 707 (4th Cir. 1976). However, "nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action." *Eisen* v. *Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).

The trial court in the present case specifically limited discovery to class determination issues. The boundary between a class determination and the merits may not always be easily discernible. *Eisen* has not been interpreted so broadly, however, as to foreclose inquiry into whether plaintiff is asserting a claim which, assuming its merit, will satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 as distinguished from an inquiry into the merits of plaintiff's particular individual claim. *Doctor* v. *Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.*, *supra*, 540 F.2d at 707. Some overlap may be unavoidable.[8] The burden of establishing class requirements rests on plaintiff, *Carracter* v. *Morgan*, 941 F.2d 458, 459 (4th Cir. 1973), but it is often the defendant, preferring not to be successfully sued by anyone, who supposedly undertakes to assist the court in determining whether a putative class should be certified. When it comes, for instance, to deter-

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[7] *See* Comment, *The Class Action and Title VII—an Overview*, 10 U. Richmond L. Rev. 325 (1976).

[8] *See* Rita J. Edwards, *Hearing on Maintainability of a Class Action Suit Should Not Determine Ultimate Merits of Individual Claim*, 11 Houston L. Rev. 732 (1974).

mining whether "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," or the plaintiffs' ability to finance the litigation, it is a bit like permitting a fox, although with a pious countenance, to take charge of the chicken house.

Under Rule 23(a) the focus of the class determination inquiry should be on certain criteria. First is numerosity. It ordinarily is not difficult to ascertain if a class approach would be useful to avoid the practical problems of trying to join many named plaintiffs or otherwise clog the docket with numerous individual suits. Except for the class approach many might never receive any redress for the wrong done them. Second is commonality. Ordinarily it is not difficult to determine if there appear to be common questions of law or fact. In a discrimination suit this requirement may be satisfied even though there may be differences in the details of individual claims. The third is typicality. The rule requires that the claims or defenses of the named parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. This simply requires a showing, not unrelated to commonality, that others suffer from similar alleged grievances. Nor is this ordinarily a difficult preliminary showing to make in many discrimination cases.

Finally is the requirement that the named parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members who are not personally involved in the litigation. This requirement is often more difficult to resolve. Whenever certain named persons purport to represent others without their knowledge or consent, the court must be assured that the named parties are qualified and capable of fully pursuing the common goals of the class without collusion or conflicts of interests. That requires competent and experienced counsel able to conduct the litigation. Even so, the class representative's role is limited. It was found not to be enough to defeat a class certification in *Surowitz*

v. *Hilton Hotels Corp.*, 383 U.S. 363, 366 (1966), that the named plaintiff did not understand her complaint at all, could not explain the statements in it, had little knowledge of what the lawsuit was about, did not know the defendants by name, nor even the nature of the misconduct of the defendants. The plaintiff, a Polish immigrant, had relied on her son-in-law. *Surowitz* appears to be an extreme case, but it does illustrate the flexibility and broad area for the exercise of the trial court's common sense and good judgment in particular instances.[9]

In addition, provided those criteria are met, there remains one of several other criterion under Rule 23(b) to be satisfied. In the present case plaintiffs allege under (b)(2) that the defendants have acted or refused to act on discriminatory grounds generally applicable to the class rendering final injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate. The invocation by plaintiffs of (b)(2) in the circumstances alleged is not novel, since it appears to have been drafted primarily for racial discrimination cases.[10]

Often it is more difficult to apply those rules to a given situation than their next initially suggests, but with the good faith assistance of the parties, a court should be able "as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action" to make the necessary and appropriate initial determination under Rule 23. After all, a favorable class determination by the court is not cast in stone. If the certification of the class is later deemed to be improvident, the court may decertify, *Sayre* v. *Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n*, 65 F.R.D. 379, 384

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[9] Recently the Supreme Court in *Deposit Guaranty National Bank* v. *Roper*, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), and *United States Parole Commission* v. *Geraghty*, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), illustrated in a different context that the fate of the named plaintiff does not always control what happens to the class.

[10] *See* Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.

(E.D. Pa. 1974); subclassify, *Wolfson* v. *Solomon*, 54 F.R.D. 584, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), alter the certification, *Hernandez* v. *United Fire Insurance Co.*, 79 F.R.D. 419, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1978), or permit intervention, *United States* v. *Trucking Employers, Inc.*, 72 F.R.D. 101, 106 (D.D.C. 1976). If, as distinguished from the ideal, the class certification inquiry is twisted and misused so as to impede, harass, discourage or to accomplish some other perceived tactical advantage, then the court's firm hand is necessary. In this case the trial court found a wilful failure to make discovery and applied the most severe sanction, dismissal of plaintiffs' cause of action with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.

The Degeneration of Class Issue Discovery

It is necessary to remember that the issue being addressed during discovery was only whether or not this case, brought by three allegedly black and two Hispanic persons, should proceed as a class action upon the allegation that they and others similarly situated had been systematically excluded from the plumbing trade in Cook County because of their race or national origin.

Discovery began with two sets of interrogatories numbering over 200 inquiries submitted to plaintiffs. These interrogatories touched on the employment history of plaintiffs, educational background, efforts to gain entry into the trade and the definition and size of the class plaintiffs sought to represent. Serious trouble erupted later when defendants sought to depose the named plaintiffs. We shall sample only a portion of defendants' interrogatories which were claimed by plaintiffs to have been objectionable.[11]

[11] We acknowledge the assistance given by the brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as *amicus curiae*, and likewise by the briefs of Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Inc., as *amicus curiae*.

It is asserted that plaintiff Eggleston over about a two and one-half day period was asked racially offensive questions and as a result was instructed by his counsel not to answer certain of those questions.[12] It is represented to us

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[12] In order to fully appreciate the general nature and tone of the race interrogation of Mr. Eggleston, it is necessary, unfortunately, to set forth lengthy selected portions of the transcript:

• • • •

Q Where was your father born, Mr. Eggleston?
A Mississippi.
Q Do you know where in Mississippi your father was born?
A No.
Q Is your father a person of Spanish origin?
A No.
Q Is your father a member of the Negro race?
A Yes.
Q And on what do you base that answer, Mr. Eggleston?
A What you said, the Negro race.
Q Have you ever discussed this case with your father?
A No.
Q What is your mother's name, Mr. Eggleston?
A Willie Anne Eggleston.
Q Is she living, sir?
A Yes.
Q What is her address?
A 1408 Cherry Street.
Q When did you last see your mother?
A I saw her the 4th of July, this year.
Q What is your mother's maiden name?
A Jones.
Q She was born Willie Anne Jones?
A. I don't know whether she was born as Willie Anne Jones, but—
Q That is her name as you know it?
A Yes.
Q Have you ever discussed this case with her?
A No.
Q Where was your mother born?
A Mississippi.

[12] *continued*

Q Do you know in what city or town in Mississippi?

A No.

Q Is your mother a person of Spanish origin?

A No.

Q Do you contend that your mother is a member of the Negro race?

A Yes.

Q And what is the basis for your belief, Mr. Eggleston?

A What has been introduced to me in the educational system of the United States.

Q What is your birth date, Mr. Eggleston?

A 7/17/39.

Q July 17, 1939?

A Correct.

Q Are you a member of the Negro race?

A Yes.

Q Is any ancestor of your Caucasian?

A I rather not answer.

Q I think it is a proper question. I believe you should answer the question, Mr. Eggleston.

MR. MINER: If you know. If you have first-hand knowledge.

BY THE WITNESS: A I can only go by what my grandmother tells me, you know. I don't know if it is true or not.

BY MR. BARRON: Q What did your grandmother tell you, sir?

A Well, she said our—she said yes.

Q Yes.

Q And is this your mother's mother or your father's mother who told you that?

A My father's mother.

Q Is she still living?

A Yes.

Q What is her name?

A Berta Eggleston. Berta or Bertie.

Q Would you tell us what she said to you about your ancestors?

MR. MINER: Listen. I am going to cut this off right now, and I will just instruct him not to answer any further questions. If you want to raise some doubt as to whether or not Mr. Eggleston is a black man, Howard, you are free to do so; but you have established that both his mother and father are members of the Negro race, and whether some hundred years ago he had some white blood intro-

[12] *continued*
duced into his system is, I think, irrelevant, and I will instruct him not to answer any more questions.

BY MR. BARRON: Q Would you answer the question, please, Mr. Eggleston?

MR. MINER: I have instructed him not to answer.

You can tell him that you are not going to answer the questions when I instruct you not to.

BY THE WITNESS: A I rather not answer.

BY MR. BARRON: Q What is your grandfathers's name, Mr. Eggleston?

A Josef Eggleston.

Q Do you know your great grandfather, Mr. Eggleston, on your father's side?

MR. MINER: Listen, Howard. This is getting bizarre. I am going to instruct him not to answer any more questions about anything beyond his grandparents just so that we might finish this in less than the time it took us to get through Mr. Plummer's deposition.

Mr. BARRON: We are not through with Mr. Plummer's deposition, Mr. Miner.

MR. MINER: I am well aware of that.

BY MR. BARRON: Q Would you answer the question, please, Mr. Eggleston?

* * * *

Q How can you tell if a person is a Negro?

A Because he is different, you know. One, he would—I can describe it to the best of my knowledge.

Q Okay.

A Okay. He is of color, African descent, and, well, I will just let it be at that.

Q Okay. I am asking for your beliefs now, and it is somewhat of an indelicate topic which was raised earlier today.

Can a person who has—who is part black, Negro, and part white be considered to be a black person, a Negro person?

A That depends on how the—I would say the society views him.

Q And that is based primarily on what?

A It is based primarily upon the opinions of the society.

* * * *

Q Do you contend that there are persons who would be described as being Negro who have some Caucasian ancestors?

A Yes.

by plaintiffs that Mr. Eggleston at least appears to qualify as a black.[13] To inquire, for instance, into what Eggleston's grandmother told him about any caucasian ancestors he may have had is a totally unjustified and reprehensible intrusion into personal family history. Defendants claim a license to fully explore race because the complaint was vague and failed to inform defendants which specific plaintiffs claimed to be black or Hispanic, and whether the charge was based on alleged racial or color discrimination or on basis of

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[12] *continued*

Q Do you contend that there are people who would be described as being Caucasian who have some Negro ancestors?

A It's possible.

Q Can you tell me what the difference is between a Negro with some Caucasian ancestors and a Caucasian with some Negro ancestors?

A There would be no difference if you don't classify them already, you know.

Q Besides Negroes, who are included in the class that you purport to represent?

A Hispanos or Hispanic.

Q What is an Hispanic?

A One of Spanish origin.

Q By that, you mean one who is born in Spain?

A Not necessarily.

Q It is a person whose ancestors were born in Spain?

A Well, yes, you could say ancestors.

Q I want to know what you say. Is it a person whose ancestors were born in Spain?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell I am a person of Spanish origin?

A No.

Q So, insofar as you know, I may be a person of Spanish origin, is that correct?

A Right.

* * * *

[13] Mr. Eggleston's counsel in his brief describes his client "as black as coal," and it is not disputed.

national origin. However, we find that defendants offer little justification for the nature and the extent of their interrogation of Eggleston. Defendants, however, claim that similar discovery yielded significant racial information about plaintiffs Rose, Taylor and Viera. We shall briefly examine each.

Defendants point out that Rose testified that he was not Spanish-surnamed and that he considered his race to be mulatto,[14] that Taylor testified that his race was mestizo,[15] and that Viera testified he was white although on his discrimination charges filed with the EEOC he indicated he had suffered racial as well as national origin discrimination. Why it is significant that Rose does not have a Spanish surname escapes us. He testified that both his father and mother were black. When asked upon what he based his knowledge that his father was black, Rose explained because "he has the same type of hair that I do." When asked about the basis of his belief that his mother was black, he declined to elaborate. Taylor testified that he was born in Cuba and came to this country in 1972 "by a political problem." He did testify that he considered his race to be "mestizo," and explained that he considered himself to be part Hispanic, not Negro. Taylor's mother was also born in Cuba and was considered by him to be of Spanish origin. He attempted by way of background to explain that people of Spanish origin were the first to come to the New World and mingled with the natives and others resulting in race combinations which he referred to as mestizo. Viera testified that he was white, but that answer

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[14] Mullatto is generally defined as a person with mixed Negro and Caucasian ancestry.

[15] Mestizo is generally defined as a person of mixed parentage sometimes meaning the offspring of a Spaniard or Portugese and an American Indian.

came in response to a question inquiring if he were black. He further testified that he had fled from Cuba in 1972, that his father was Cuban. Ironically, defendants complain of the lack of an interpreter to help them in questioning Viera because he was fluent only in Spanish.

In our view some limited exploration of race was appropriate, but what we have witnessed in this case is an objectional effort by defendants to administer some sort of verbal blood test to each defendant. This is not a paternity suit. It should have been an effort to assist the court in determining whether or not plaintiffs qualified as class representatives in a suit charging that certain minorities were being excluded from the plumbing trade. For the purposes of this case, we do not need a legal laboratory to analyze blood samples drawn from the plaintiffs in order to type them into possible subclasses or for any other reason. It should not be so difficult and disagreeable to determine if plaintiffs are black enough or Hispanic enough to satisfy any reasonable criteria in order to qualify to represent others in class composed of ordinary blacks and Hispanics.

Apart from the racial probing, other avenues of defendants' inquiry deserve examination. Although the deposition was not scheduled as a bar examination, Eggleston and Rose were asked questions some members of the bar might have difficulty answering correctly.[16]

Religion also got some attention. Eggleston was asked if he purported to represent Jews as well as Buddhists. We find no issue of religion in the case.

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[16] For example, Eggleston was asked if he had ever heard of Rule 23 and what the requirements of a class action were. Rose was asked, for instance, if he knew whether Local 130 was "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" or if he knew whether Local 130 was "a labor organization within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000-D." Rose was asked if he knew what subclasses were and if he thought there should be subclasses in this case.

Even though the deposition was not an examination to determine if Eggleston should be issued a plumber's license by the State of Illinois, some of the questions suggest otherwise.[17]

Some of the defendants' questions demonstrate a stubborn tendency to insist on valueless answers.[18]

Some of the defendants' questions were argumentative and senseless.[19]

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[17] For example, Eggleston was asked about fabricating piping systems, principles of corrosion, cross connections, glove valves, check valves, etc.

[18] An example from the interrogation of Rose:

• • • •

Q When you discussed with Mr. Miner [one of the plaintiffs' counsel] the facts known to him which gave rise to your allegations in this complaint, were you and Mr. Miner alone?

A Yes.

Q When you talked to him on the telephone, were there any other persons who were in on that telephone conversation?

A Unless Mr. Miner has a party line, the answer would be no.

Q Is your answer then that you don't know?

A I said unless Mr. Miner has a party line, the answer is no.

Q Does Mr. Miner have a party line?

A You would have to ask Mr. Miner.

Q Do you know whether Mr. Miner has a party line?

A You would have to ask Mr. Miner. I don't pay his telephone bill. I don't know his installations.

Q Do you know whether Mr. Miner has a party line?

A I do not know whether Mr. Miner has a party line.

[19] An example from the Rose deposition will suffice. Reference was made to an exhibit in which a sentence stated that a class action was the best method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Rose was asked what the allegation was based on. Rose first answered that it would eliminate racial discrimination. Several questions later that particular sentence was still the object of the interrogation:

• • • •

[19] *continued*

Q How would that sentence eliminate racial discrimination?

A It's the best available method for fair and effective adjudication of the controversy, quote.

Q Is that how that sentence would eliminate racial discrimination?

A Partially.

Q How else would it eliminate racial discrimination?

A By doing what's just.

Q How would it do what is just?

A By dropping the racial barriers.

Q How would that sentence do that?

A I have answered to the best of my knowledge.

Q I don't believe you have answered that question, Mr. Rose.

A As far as Hispanic and black, I have answered it to the best of my knowledge.

Q Would that sentence eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex?

* * * *

Two more pages (six questions) later the matter had not yet been concluded:

Q What is your basis for your allegation that a class action is the best available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy?

MS. ANDERSON: I am going to object. I think that question has just been answered, and he answered it to the best of his ability.

Now, I don't see why we have to keep going over and over this for five dozen times.

BY MR. MANDEL: Q Mr. Rose, will you answer the question?

A I have answered it to the best of my knowledge. I told you this previously. Now, if you want to badger, go ahead.

Q What is the basis for your belief that class action is the best available method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy?

MS. ANDERSON: I am going to instruct him not to answer since he has answered the question to the best of his ability and he has so stated on the record.

* * * *

Some questions were repetitious,[20] or worse.

Other questions sought to test what one plaintiff knew concerning a co-plaintiff's knowledge about the merits of the case.[21]

Defendants defend their extensive explorations, but our examination of their excesses, some of which we have briefly sampled herein, satisfies us that they were more interested in tactics than answers. Defendants did not move to compel

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[20] A concise example from the Eggleston deposition will suffice. Eggleston was asked if he knew who the defendants in the case were. Plaintiffs' counsel objected that the question had been asked and answered just the day before. Defendant's counsel then responded:

* * * *

MR. MANDEL: I'm asking Mr. Eggleston if he *knows today* who the defendants in this case are [emphasis added].

* * * *

[21] Paragraph 12C of plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged that Local 130 had refused to issue licenses or permits to blacks or Hispanics who sought employment as plumbers. A series of questions propounded to Eggleston about not only paragraph 12C but also other paragraphs of the complaint sought to find out what he knew about his co-plaintiffs' claims.

* * * *

Q. Upon what facts do the other plaintiffs in this case base their allegations in Paragraph 12C?

* * * *

Q. Do you know of any of the other facts upon which the other plaintiffs in this case base their allegations in Paragraph 12C?

* * * *

Q. How do you know the allegations in Paragraph 12C are based on facts known to the other plaintiffs?

* * * *

Q. What facts known to other persons is it [Paragraph 12C] based on?

* * * *

answers to many of their more inappropriate questions, so the significance of the omitted questions was not highlighted to the trial judge. After Viera and Eggleston were dismissed, the defendants moved to compel the remaining plaintiffs to answer approximately 408 of the 965 deposition questions which had not been answered. That left approximately 551 unanswered questions to which defendants did not seek to compel answers. If, however, those unanswered questions were not worth pursuing, they were not relevant or worth asking in the first place. The stack of depositions examined by this court exceeds a foot in height and this is supposed to represent discovery solely on the class issue. It is an example of "runaway" discovery which is excessive, burdensome, unnecessary and intrusive. The attack by deposition appears to have been designed for some other purpose than to assist the court in making a class determination. We see no justification for a verbal third degree to resolve the class issue.

The fault, however, is not all one sided by any means. Plaintiffs' counsel must share in the responsibility for this deposition mess. It is difficult to tell which side can be said to have actually started the trouble. In this chicken or egg situation, we have decided to concentrate on the deposition questions as the principal basis for our view of the affair, but that does not mean that we minimize the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel. There were 965 refusals to answer by plaintiffs with only a limited number of those refusals being related to the excesses we have considered. The wholesale practice of plaintiffs in refusing to answer many questions which were unrelated to a claim of privilege, *Ralston Purina Co.* v. *McFarland*, 550 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1977), or without taking the initiative of seeking relief from the court

in advance under either Rule 26(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.,[22] or during the course of the interrogation under Rule 30(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.,[23] contributed significantly to the disarray.

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[22] Rule 26(c) provides:

(c) *Protective Orders.* Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.

If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

[23] Rule 30(d) provides:

(d) *Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination.* At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party,

Plaintiffs counter that if defendants desired an answer to their questions, it was their responsibility to move under Rule 37(a) for an order compelling discovery. Defendants utilized that remedy to some extent. Plaintiffs also note that defendants (on rare occasions) also instructed their witness not to answer during depositions. There were also an estimated 127 private, off-the-record conferences between plaintiffs and their counsel, many of which occurred between the question and answer or the declination to answer. It is too late once the ball has been snapped for the coach to send in a different play. Sometimes plaintiffs' counsel would interrupt their client's answer and instruct that enough had been said. Other answers were evasive. The parties appeared before the trial judge on five occasions to report on the progress of class discovery, but plaintiffs' counsel did not move for a protective order or complain about the racial harassment now claimed on appeal. There were numerous unprofessional exchanges between counsel more suggestive of an argument in an alley than a professional undertaking. A large share of those exchanges appear to have been provoked by plaintiffs' counsel.

Other obstructive tactics were used. The depositions of Viera and Eggleston were aborted unilaterally by plain-

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[23] *continued*

the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district where the deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). If the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the court in which the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

tiffs, and never completed, although plaintiffs seek to justify those actions. The trial court's warnings were not heeded. Plaintiffs' counsel evidenced little willingness to help resolve the impasse. Instead counsel charged the trial judge with bias.

Having tried to control this situation, the trial judge dismissed Eggleston and Viera for failure to appear to complete their depositions and subsequently dismissed the claims of the remaining three plaintiffs with prejudice for their "evasive and thwarting conduct." Even though we find a reversal to be necessary, we do not fault the efforts of the trial judge. Nor do we endeavor to assign fault to one side or the other, as there is more than enough fault for counsel on both sides to share.

Deposition Procedures

Plaintiffs' wholesale refusals to answer questions, whether the questions were arguably relevant or not, raises deposition procedural questions deserving of brief examination. Some courts view an attorney's direction that a question not be answered (except if privileged) as highly improper, as the answer should be given subject to objection, or the matter raised pursuant to Rule 30(d). *Ralston Purina Co.* v. *McFarland, supra,* 550 F.2d at 973-74. In the Northern District of Illinois where the present case arose, and to some extent in reliance upon it, it is announced in *Coates* v. *Johnson and Johnson,* 85 F.R.D. 731, 733 (N.D. Ill. 1980), that "the general rule in this district is that absent a claim of privilege, it is improper for counsel at a deposition to instruct a client not to answer. If counsel objects to a question, he should state his objection for the record and then allow the question to be answered." Wright & Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure:* Civil § 2113, at 419 n.22 (1970), is also relied upon as it suggests that the better practice is to

take the evidence subject to objection. It is noted in *Coates, supra,* 85 F.R.D. at 733, that in *Shapiro* v. *Freeman,* 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), it was indicated that "[i]t is not the prerogative of counsel, but of the court to rule on objections." Moore, however, states that when either privileged or irrelevant information is sought "the only course it to decline to answer." 4A *Moore's Federal Practice,* 37.02[2] (1981). Plaintiffs, in support of their refusal to answer without seeking court guidance, have supplied numerous affidavits of area attorneys who follow that same practice. Plaintiffs also point to Judge Robson's prior decision in *In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,* 83 F.R.D. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1979), as condoning the practice which they followed.

The district court has wide discretion within the rules to determine the manner and course of discovery. *Burns* v. *Thiokol Chemical Corp.,* 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1973). We do not propose by this case to impose any particular practice on the district courts. No due process or similar objection has been raised. It does appear that some counsel may not be aware of the local procedures. Confusion about the approved practice may have contributed somewhat to the problems, but does not excuse them in this case.

We believe it would be difficult to fashion a hard and fast rule to apply to all situations which did not at times have impractical side effects. Depositions cannot be taken in the judge's reception room so that the judge always will be readily available to either counsel. Rule 26(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., limits discovery to matters which are not privileged, but it also requires that the matters be "relevant." "Relevant" is defined in Rule 401, Federal Rules of Evidence,[24]

[24] Rule 401 provides:

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

but relevancy in the context of a discovery deposition has a broader meaning. Admissibility at trial is not the test. Evidence is relevant in a discovery context if it is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation as Rule 26(b)(1) states, not just the particular issues presented in the pleadings. A more liberal interpretation is allowed, *Duplan Corp.* v. *Deering Milliken, Inc.*, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1187 (D.S.C. 1974) (and the cases cited therein), and "flexible treatment" is required, *Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp.* v. *Imoco-Gateway Corp.*, 357 F. Supp. 659, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1973). There is no requirement that every relevant question, as broadly interpreted, which counsel can conjure up must be asked. Only what is reasonably necessary for the particular purpose, in this case class certification, is appropriate.

With a liberal interpretation of relevance comes the risk of abuse and good faith differences of opinion. It is accepted that a question calling for privileged matter need not be answered. To answer subject to an objection of privilege could destroy the privilege. Relevancy, although mentioned in the rule along with privilege, does not necessarily deserve the same respect.

Rule 30(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., says the evidence should be taken subject to the objection. Some questions of doubtful relevancy may be innocuous and nothing is lost in answering, subject to objection, except time. That is the general rule. Other irrelevant questions, however, may unnecessarily touch sensitive areas or go beyond reasonable limits as did some of the race questions propounded to Eggleston. In such an event, refusing to answer may be justified. *In re Folding Cartons* does not condone wholesale refusals, but displays thoughtful flexibility in limited instances. There is no more need for a deponent to seek a protective order for every question when a dispute arises than there is a need to seek to compel an answer for each unanswered

question. If a particular question is important or opens up a whole area of questionable relevance, or other serious problems develop which counsel cannot solve themselves, then resorting to the court may be justified or necessary.

Each side has available remedies. Rule 30(d) protects a deponent from bad faith questioning, or questioning in such a manner as may unreasonably annoy, embarrass, or oppress. There may be times when that rule also deserves a liberal interpretation to curb abuse. On the other hand, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 provides for compelling a response. Counsel should be able to resolve many of the controversies themselves leaving to the court only those important matters otherwise unresolvable. It may be more practical in some situations to accumulate the unresolved problems so as not to be constantly interrupting a deposition to run to an overworked judge. If it appears that there is a significant disagreement about discovery, it may also be worthwhile to seek a discovery conference under new Rule 26(f). That is permitted at any time after commencement of the suit upon certain conditions. The discovery conference should make the applicable rules clear. If the exercise of common sense and good professional judgment by counsel in a reasonable and flexible manner fail to solve the problem, then remedies are available, and sanctions, too.[25] Each counsel has the responsibility to attempt to resolve conflicts. Different situations may require different steps to be taken. When the court's aid is sought the matter must be fairly and fully presented. In the present case, plaintiffs' coun-

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[25] *See* Note, *Recent Trends in the Enforcement of Discovery: Sanctions in the Federal Courts and in Illinois*, 11 Loyola U. L. J. 773 (1980). For a current discussion of discovery abuse and the use of sanctions in complex litigation, *see* American College of Trial Lawyers Recommendations on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigations, pp. 5-19 (Feb. 27, 1981). Much of the discussion there need not be restricted to complex litigation.

sel complains here of problems neither fully nor timely brought to the trial court's attention.

Ordinarily we would condone the use of appropriate sanctions when attorneys forsake their professional responsibilities, but in this discrimination case the sanctions fall too heavily upon the individual plaintiffs who were not knowledgeable in the ways of the law, as well as on the other putative members of the class they seek to assist. Members of the putative class, knowing of this present ordeal, could not but be discouraged from instituting similar individual undertakings against these defendants. If there is any merit to the charges of discrimination against minorities by those who control the plumbing trade in the Chicago area, then, too, the dismissal sanction rests too heavily upon the public.

We believe that Senior Judge Robson should be relieved of the burden of this vexatious case by the application of Circuit Rule 18 on remand as the case is still in its initial stages. Discovery on the merits may still lie ahead if a class is certified.

It is not for us to decide whether the class issue has been sufficiently explored to permit its determination. We leave that for the trial court. The volumes of discovery suggest that enough is enough, but it may be found that some additional discovery reasonably may be needed in certain clearly defined areas. If so, it should be expeditiously accomplished.

The Supreme Court in *Hickman* v. *Taylor*, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947), acknowledged that "[N]o longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case," but the Court also stated that discovery "has ultimate and necessary boundaries." In a simple discrimination case such as this one, where the only current discovery

issue relates to class certification, although concededly an important issue, the "fishing license" nevertheless need ordinarily be only a limited one with an early expiration date. "It is well established that discovery has limits and that these limits grow more formidable as the showing of need decreases." *United Air Lines, Inc.* v. *United States*, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 n.9 (D.Del. 1960).

In order to complete discovery upon the class issue or later upon the merits of the Title VII or § 1981 claims themselves, the trial court may find it useful in this case in view of the exceptional circumstances created by the past performances of counsel to consider the appointment of a master pursuant to Rule 53, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[26] We recommend this course, as an on the spot "referee" may be needed to expedite further discovery. The costs of using this procedure will fall upon the parties and possibly serve as a deterrent to further abuse. The designation of a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), while also viable, is a less satisfactory alternative as magistrates have numerous other duties besides refereeing where no referee should ordinarily be needed.

In the circumstances of this case we are lifting the particular sanctions applied to plaintiffs because the general deterioration cannot be attributed solely to plaintiffs. Under the circumstances, we consider it an abuse of discretion to have tried to cure abuse on both sides by denying plaintiffs all opportunity for relief. No hint of further discovery abuse by any party in this case should be tolerated.

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[26] *Ominium Lyonnais D'Etancheite et Revetement Asphalte* v. *Dow Chemical Co.*, 73 F.R.D. 114, 117-18 (C.D. Cal. 1977); *Fisher* v. *Harris, Upham & Co., Inc.*, 61 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), *appeal dismissed*, 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975).

II.

Plaintiffs also allege that the trial court erred in dismissing their Title VII claim against defendant the JAC. We agree and therefore reverse the JAC's dismissal.

On October 28, 1975, plaintiff Rose filed a timely EEOC charge alleging that Plumbers' Local 130 had refused to hire him as an apprentice or journeyman plumber.[27] On March 9, 1977, Rose filed an amended EEOC charge, naming PCA, Local 130, the International Union, and the JAC.[28]

The district court, in response to a motion by the JAC, dismissed plaintiffs' Title VII claim against the JAC, *Plummer* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union 130, U.A.*, 452 F. Supp. 1127, 1132-36 (N.D. Ill. 1978). In so doing, the court ruled that Rose's original charge did not properly name the JAC; that the mended charge was untimely as it was filed more than 180 days subsequent to Rose's last EEOC application; and that the JAC was not

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[27] Rose's first EEOC charge read:

I have been denied entrance into the plumbers' union because of my race, Black. I was told on 8/12/75 that they were not taking any new apprentices. For the last 14 years they have denied me entrance.

[28] Rose's second charge read:

I have been denied an opportunity to obtain a status of journeyman plumber and entrance into the Plumbers Union because of my race. The last time I aplied was on August 21, 1975. I had also applied on numerous occasions during the past 14 years. During the same period, I have also applied for entrance into the Apprenticeship Program. I was repeatedly given the run-around until August 21, 1975 when I was advised that they were not taking any new Apprentices.

an agent of Local 130 and the PCA and thus could not be sued in such a capacity.[29]

The JAC argues that the dismissal of the Title VII claim was proper because plaintiff Rose failed to name the JAC in his initial charges filed with the EEOC. Title VII provides that if after timely filing of a discrimination charge, the EEOC is unable to obtain compliance with the Act's provisions, "a civil action may be brought against the respondent in the charge" by the person claiming to be aggrieved. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Accordingly, it is well settled that ordinarily a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII. *Le Beau* v. *Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.*, 484 F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir. 1973) (Clark, J.); *Williamson* v. *Bethlehem Steel Corp.*, 488 F. Supp. 827, 835 (W.D.N.Y. 1980). This requirement is said to be jurisdictional, *Alexander* v. *Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the reason being that the charge serves to notify the charged party of the alleged violation and also brings the party before the EEOC, making possible effectuation of the Act's primary goal of securing voluntary compliance with its mandates. *Bowe* v. *Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969). *See Williams* v. *General Foods Corp.*, 492 F.2d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 1974).

With the two-fold purposes of EEOC charge filing in mind, courts have recognized several exceptions to the rule that parties not named in the EEOC charge are not subject to suit in a private civil action. As to one exception of import here, this court has determined that where an un-

[29] Since we determine that Rose's original charge was sufficient to reinstate the JAC within the trial court's jurisdiction, we need not address the propriety of the court's rulings as to the timeliness of the later charge or as to its agency rulings.

named party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance, the charge is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that party. *Davis* v. *Weidner*, 596 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1979); *Williams* v. *General Foods Corp., supra*, 492 F.2d at 404-05. *Accord, Romero* v. *Union Pacific Railroad Co.*, 615 F.2d 1303, 1311-12 (10th Cir. 1980); *Kaplan* v. *International Alliance of Threatrical and Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators*, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1975).

The purpose behind this exception is to prevent frustration of the goals of Title VII by not requiring procedural exactness in stating the charges. *Davis* v. *Weidner, supra*, 596 F.2d at 729, *citing, Love* v. *Pullman Co.*, 404 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1972). Complainants often file EEOC charges without the assistance of counsel and are not versed either in the technicalities of pleading or the jurisdictional requirements of the Act itself. *Stevenson* v. *International Paper Co.*, 432 F. Supp. 390, 395 (W.D. La. 1977). They are also not expected to file EEOC charges which specifically articulate in precise terms, a narrow legal wrong which they have suffered, rather EEOC charges are typically detailed in layperson's terms. *Tillman* v. *City of Boaz*, 548 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (and the cases cited therein). It is noted, in addition, that Congress could not have intended that a person filing EEOC charges should accurately ascertain, at the risk of later facing dismissal, at the time the charges were made, every separate entity which may have violated Title VII. *Glus* v. *G. C. Murphy Co.*, 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977) (*"Glus I"*). Thus, given the Act's remedial purposes, charges are to be construed with "utmost liberality" and parties sufficiently named or alluded

to in the factual statement are to be joined.[30] *Jenkins* v. *Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance Inc.*, 538 F.2d 164, 166-68 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); *Sanchez* v. *Standard Brands, Inc.*, 431 F.2d 455, 462-63, 465 (5th Cir. 1970); *Martin* v. *Easton Publishing Co.*, 478 F. Supp. 796, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (and the cases cited therein).

Hence, we must first consider whether Rose's initial charge adequately served to notify the JAC of the alleged violation. Our reference to the record convinces us that the JAC *was* sufficiently apprised of the charge to meet this notice requirement. We begin by noting that five members of the ten person JAC board have been appointed by Local 130. These five individuals, as of the date of Rose's 1975 charge, were *all* serving as officers within Local 130, while simultaneously serving on the JAC. Their positions within Local 130 include respectively: the business manager, the business representative, an executive board member, the vice-president, and the recording secretary. Moreover, the JAC coordinator has served as an elected officer in Local 130 since 1966, and has signed affidavits and other pleadings in this litigation in the JAC's behalf.

The charge itself, which named Local 130, clearly complained of discriminatory exclusion from the apprenticeship program. Given that the JAC administers the only apprentice program of record, the charge was sufficient to apprise both the EEOC and the JAC of the alleged discriminatory practices. *Compare Kaplan* v. *International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, supra*, 525 F.2d at 1359.

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[30] We are mindful that while liberality in construction is favored, some minimum standards of statutory compliance are essential in light of the strong emphasis upon voluntary compliance and conciliation. *See Scott* v. *University of Delaware*, 385 F. Supp. 937, 941 (D. Del. 1974).

Accordingly, in light of the substantial similarity in the interests of the JAC and Local 130—the named party, and given both the JAC representation and implication within the charge itself, we hold that the JAC knew or should have known of the EEOC charge and that their conduct would be subject to EEOC inquiry. *Compare Goodman* v. *Board of Trustees of Community College District 524*, 498 F. Supp. 1329, 1333-34 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Thus, the first prong of this exception, which would permit jurisdiction over the JAC, has been satisfied.

We must also ascertain whether the JAC has been given an opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance with Title VII. While satisfaction of this prong presents some difficulty, we conclude that it also has been met. *See Williams* v. *General Foods Corp., supra*, 492 F.2d at 405.

Resolution of this subissue requires consideration of the policies behind and purposes of conciliation. Conciliation between the parties may solve discriminatory problems without the animosities created by coercion, and it provides the respondent with the chance to voluntarily explain and justify past conduct prior to the expense, publicity, and time consumption associated with litigation. *See Martin* v. *Easton Publishing Co., supra*, 478 F. Supp. at 797; *Scott* v. *University of Delaware, supra*, 385 F. Supp. at 941. However, we are mindful that while conciliation is encouraged, it is not an inalienable right of a defendant. *Gamble* v. *Birmingham Southern Railroad Co.*, 514 F.2d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 1975). These related policies and purposes must be balanced against the "availability of complete redress of legitimate grievances without undue encumbrance by procedural requirements especially when demanding full and technical compliance would have no relation to the purposes for requiring those procedures in the first instance." *Glus I, supra*, 562 F.2d at 888.

Upon balancing these considerations, we find that the JAC has been presented with a sufficient opportunity to conciliate.[31] As soon as the JAC had notice of the charge, either through its Local 130 members or through the JAC coordinator, nothing prevented it from attempting to resolve the alleged discrimination in an amicable manner. Any opportunity to effect voluntary compliance of Local 130 by the EEOC would have necessarily involved contact with the JAC, its coordinator, and its other members. *Compare Kelly* v. *Richland School District 2,* 463 F. Supp. 216, 218-21 (D.S.C. 1978); *Wong* v. *Calvin,* 87 F.R.D. 145, 149 (N.D. Fla. 1980). Thus, the JAC was presented with an adequate opportunity in this regard. Moreover, if a party has a close relationship with a named respondent, as does the JAC, and has actual notice of the EEOC charge, as it is likely the JAC has had, to the extent that the JAC could have participated in conciliation efforts, the JAC "should not be heard to cry 'foul' when later made a defendant in a suit. . . ." *Stevenson* v. *International Paper Co., supra,* 432 F. Supp. at 397-98.

We question, in addition, the futility of presenting the JAC with more of an opportunity to conciliate than was presented herein. The Local 130 itself was unwilling to reach settlement with Rose or any other plaintiff and has fought their lawsuit with unmatched ferocity. It would seem reasonable from Rose's standpoint that if voluntary compliance was not obtainable through the EEOC from Local 130, the addition of the JAC to the conciliation effort would have made little if any difference. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the JAC did not settle the claims against it after Rose filed his later EEOC charge, specifically naming the JAC.

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[31] Thus, we must reject the JAC's argument that it was presented with no opportunity to conciliate.

Since the JAC was properly noticed and provided with the requisite opportunity for conciliation, its dismissal as a Title VII defendant by the district court was error.[32] Thus, the JAC must be reinstated as a defendant to plaintiffs' Title VII claim.

Our reference to the oft-cited factors employed by the Third Circuit and other courts in making this determination compels the same conclusion.[33] In *Glus I, supra,* 562 F.2d at 888, the court combined the factors underlying the established exceptions into a four pronged test for use in determining whether to excuse a failure by an individual plaintiff to name a defendant in the EEOC charge:

> (1) Whether the role of the unnamed party could through reasonable effort by the complainant be ascertained at the time of the filing of the EEOC complaint.
>
> (2) Whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named party are so similar to the unnamed party's that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings.

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[32] The JAC is probably an indispensible party for Title VII purposes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, as it administers the Local 130-PCA apprenticeship program and controls, in part, access to the plumbing trade. *See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,* 164 U.S. App. D.C. 86, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (1974); *E.E.O.C. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,* 476 F. Supp. 341, 349-50 (D. Mass. 1979); *Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee,* 440 F. Supp. 506, 524-26 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (and the cases cited therein). Given our holding herein, however, we need not reach this issue.

[33] While it is normally within the province of the district court to initially consider such factors and to make the jurisdictional determinations, where that court has implicitly considered the factors and so ruled, and where the record is sufficiently established, as it is here, we may evaluate the factors without remand. *See Romero v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra.* 615 F.2d at 1312.

(3) Whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party.

(4) Whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be through the named party.

In *Glus* v. *C. G. Murphy Co.*, 629 F.2d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 1980), *vacated on other grounds,* 101 S. Ct. 2013 (1981) (*"Glus II"*), the Third Circuit noted that the four pronged test is not a mechanical one, and accordingly no single prong is to be decisive. Instead, each prong must be carefully evaluated in light of both Title VII's remedial purposes as well as the interests of the parties.

As to the first prong, nothing indicates that Rose had any way of knowing the extent of the JAC's involvement in the allegedly discriminatory action or their motivation. *Compare Green* v. *United States Steel Corp.*, 481 F.Supp. 295, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1979); *Martin* v. *Easton Publishing Co., supra,* 478 F. Supp. at 798. Given the close relationship between Local 130 and the JAC, it would be unreasonable, contrary to the JAC's view, to expect that Rose would be cognizant that the JAC possessed a legal identity separate and distinct from Local 130—the named party. The second prong also supports plaintiffs' position. In addition to the above-detailed considerations concerning the opportunity for conciliation by the JAC, the interests of the JAC, while not identical to those of Local 130, are similar enough that, if Local 130 complied or conciliated, surely the JAC would perforce comply. The conciliation process was not rendered less effective because of the JAC's absence. As to the third prong, no prejudice, contrary to the JAC's assertions, is present in the record and no likelihood of compliance, explanation, or justification is evident. It is highly unlikely, that if the JAC had been given an opportunity to conciliate, that any of the alleged past practices would have been recti-

fied. We again note that the JAC effected no conciliation under Rose's later charge, which specifically named the JAC. The fourth prong, if anything, supports plaintiffs. The JAC's full name—the "Joint Apprenticeship Committee Local 130, U.A." indicates that Local 130 *could* have been the party with whom Rose should have contacted or identified. The close relationship between Local 130 and the JAC both in terms of board members, its coordinator, and the officers could have led Rose to reasonably assume that the interests of both were represented by Local 130.[34] *Compare Glus II, supra,* 629 F.2d at 252.

Circuit Rule 18 shall apply.[35] Parties shall bear their own costs.[36]

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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[34] While the record is unclear, it appears that the apprentice cards issued by the JAC state that the apprentice holders are affiliates of "Chicago Journeymen Plumbers, Local 130."

[35] On February 4, 1980, the defendant-appellees moved this court to dismiss appeal No. 80-1008 for want of appellate jurisdiction. The motion was denied on March 3, 1980 (Bauer, J.). On March 7, 1980, defendants-appellees' motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss was denied, without prejudice to the defendants-appellees again raising the jurisdictional arguments in the merits briefing of these appeals (Bauer, J.). Finding an absence of discussion of these arguments in the defendants-appellees' briefs, the request for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss is deemed to have been waived. In any event, the denial of the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was proper.

Objection is also made by plaintiffs that sanctions were imposed without a specific order being violated as might be obtained under Rule 37. In view of our disposition of this case that issue need not now be explored.

[36] Nothing in this opinion is intended to imply any view whatsoever as to the possible merit of plaintiffs' claims, but what has happened so far in this case is not the way to find out whether there may be merit or not.

A true Copy:
Teste:

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Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

October 7, 1981

Before

Hon. THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge
Hon. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge
Hon. WALTER E. HOFFMAN, Senior District Judge*

JOSEF EGGLESTON and ALBERT VIERA, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 80-1008

vs.

CHICAGO JOURNEYMEN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U.A., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

EDELL PLUMMER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 80-1650

vs.

CHICAGO JOURNEYMEN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U.A., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 77-C-1726

Edwin A. Robson, Judge

ORDER

On consideration of the petitions for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *in banc* and the "MOTION FOR

* The Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Senior District Judge of the Eastern District of Virginia, is sitting by designation.

LEAVE TO FILE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING IN BANC" filed in the above-entitled cause by counsel for the defendants-appellees, no judge in active service has requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original panel have voted to deny a rehearing. According,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petitions for rehearing and motion be, and the same are hereby, DENIED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, JOSEF J. EGGLESTON, IVOR TAYLOR, and ALBERTO VIERA, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO JOURNEYMAN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U.A., PLUMBING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY, and THE JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, LOCAL NO. 130, U.S.A., Defendants	No. 77 C 1726

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on the motions of defendants to compel discovery and for sanctions and on motion of plaintiffs for sanctions. For the reasons hereinafter stated, defendants' motions are granted, and plaintiffs' motion is denied.

These motions arise out of disputes between plaintiffs and defendants in regard to discovery on class action issues. Defendants Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A. [hereinafter Local 130], the Plumbing Contractors Association of Chicago and Cook County [hereinafter PCA], and the Joint Apprenticeship Committee, Local 130, U.A. [hereinafter JAC] seek an order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff Alberto Viera's claims for refusal to comply with their discovery requests, or, in the alternative, for an order compelling Viera to appear for continuation of his deposition on class issues. Defendants Local 130 and JAC bring the same motion with respect to plaintiff Josef Eggleston. Defendants Local 130 and PCA further seek an order that the remainder of the plaintiffs answer certain questions on class issues which plaintiffs refused to answer during their depositions, questions which were not asked because of plaintiffs' prior stipulated refusals to answer, and additional questions to clarify or amplify the answers given to previously unanswered questions. All defendants seek an order that plaintiffs and their attorneys pay their reasonable expenses including attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the motions to compel. Defendant PCA further seeks an order that plaintiffs and their attorneys pay their reasonable expenses including attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the first day of the deposition of plaintiff Viera. Plaintiffs have responded by their own motion for sanctions and by a memorandum in opposition to defendants' motions to compel. Defendants have replied.

I. Background

Plaintiffs brought their complaint as a class action alleging employment discrimination in the plumbing trade by defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.*, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court limited initial discovery to matters relevant in determining whether this action should proceed as a class action. *Plummer* v. *Local 130*, 77 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ill. 1977) [hereinafter *Plummer*]. Interrogatories were exchanged by the parties and answered only after motions to compel were brought by both plaintiffs and defendants.

On May 30, 1978, PCA filed notices of deposition of the five named plaintiffs. On June 2, 1978, plaintiffs requested a meeting with defendants to discuss coordination of the depositions and to request that the depositions cover both class action and merits issues. The parties met with an agreement reached by all defendants with plaintiffs to coordinate the depositions so that each plaintiff would be examined first by PCA, and then by Local 130 and JAC. In addition, based on the court's previous decision to have the parties proceed with class discovery prior to discovery on the merits, the defendants refused plaintiffs' request to extend the depositions to include both class action and merit issues.

After considerable delay, plaintiffs' depositions began on September 12, 1978. At the depositions, plaintiffs' attorneys unilaterally determined which questions they considered to be proper questions and frequently directed their clients not to answer questions they considered to be improper. The five plaintiffs refused to answer 965 questions upon the advice of their attorneys. In addition, many questions were never asked at the depositions because plaintiffs' attorneys announced in advance that their clients would not be permitted to answer questions in certain subject matter areas. Plaintiff Edell Plummer refused to answer 472 questions upon the advice of his attorneys. In addition, defendants did not pursue questions concerning Plummer's

experience in the plumbing trade and concerning classmates at Dunbar High School who could have been interested in the plumbing trade, because they stipulated with plaintiffs' attorneys that these questions would be subject to instructions not to answer. Plaintiff Josef Eggleston refused to answer 208 questions upon the advice of his attorneys. His deposition was unilaterally terminated by his counsel during examination by Local 130. Plaintiff Hayward Rose refused to answer 172 questions upon the advice of his attorneys, and stipulations were entered into by plaintiffs and defendants to the effect that Rose would not answer questions concerning his finances or his plumbing experience. Plaintiff Ivor Taylor refused to answer 71 questions, and stipulations were entered into by plaintiffs and defendants to the effect that Taylor would not answer questions concerning his knowledge or opinion as to the class he sought to represent, his plumbing experience, and plaintiffs' costs and expenses. Plaintiff Alberto Viera refused to answer 42 questions, and a stipulation was entered into the effect that he would not answer questions concerning his own financial resources and plaintiffs' expenses. Viera's deposition was terminated by agreement of the parties because Viera became ill at the deposition. Subsequently, plaintiffs' attorneys refused to produce Viera for his continued deposition despite their previous agreement to do so. The decrease in the refusals to answer in the depositions of Rose, Taylor, and Viera was not due to a decrease in objectionable conduct by plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys. It was due to defendants not asking questions which were earlier the subject of refusals to answer in the depositions of other plaintiffs and to defendants and plaintiffs entering into stipulations that plaintiffs would not answer questions in certain subject areas if the questions were asked.

Plaintiffs and their attorneys further disrupted the deposition proceedings by stopping the depositions on at least 127 occasions to hold conferences with each other out of the presence of opposing counsel and the court reporter. During the depositions, plaintiff Plummer had 27 conferences with his attorney Judson Miner, Eggleston had 8 conferences, Rose had 22 conferences, and Taylor had 69 conferences. Ostensibly, these conferences were for the purpose of clarification but the frequency of the conferences and the fact that many of the conferences took place after a question was asked and before a plaintiff could answer suggest that the attorneys were coaching the plaintiffs. In so doing, plaintiffs' attorneys disregarded their ethical duty under Canon 7, EC 7-19, to put the relevant facts before the court for adjudication by disrupting the orderly discovery process.

Even in the case of plaintiff Ivor Taylor, a Spanish speaking plaintiff; where the conferences may have been necessary because of confusion caused by Taylor's difficulty in understanding English, coaching of the witness appears to have been the primary reason for those conferences. Judson Miner, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys, who admittedly speaks no Spanish, conferred with his client at least 36 times out of the presence of all those in attendance at the deposition. The proper procedure was, as stated by William Snapp, the examining attorney for defendant PCA, to have the witness let examining counsel know if a question was not understood, and the question would then be explained further on the record. Taylor deposition at 210. Subsequently, Mr. Minor brought a Spanish-speaking attorney from his office, George Galland, Jr., to assist him. Within 55 pages of deposition testimony, Mr. Galland had 21 conferences with Mr. Taylor in Spanish, a language that none of the defendants' attorneys understood. Even after

an interpreter was brought for the next session of the deposition, plaintiffs' attorneys had 4 more conferences with their client during the deposition.

Plaintiff Josef Eggleston appeared for his deposition on October 31, 1978. After the examination by PCA, Local 130 began its questioning of Eggleston. After refusing to answer 45 questions upon the direction of counsel concerning his experience, skill, or qualifications as a journeyman plumber, plaintiffs' counsel, Judson Miner, unilaterally terminated the deposition. Plaintiffs took no action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 30 (d) to limit or terminate the examination. Plaintiffs have subsequently refused to produce Eggleston to continue his deposition.

After experiencing the frequent conferences between plaintiff Ivor Taylor, a Spanish-speaking plaintiff, and his attorneys (ostensibly because of Taylor's difficulty in communicating in English), defendant PCA's counsel inquired of plaintiffs' counsel whether a Spanish interpreter would be necessary for the deposition of Alberto Viera, a Spanish-speaking plaintiff. Plaintiffs' counsel made no attempt to inform PCA's counsel whether an interpreter would be necessary, so no interpreter was present at the deposition on December 11, 1978. After approximately four hours of examination PCA sought to terminate the deposition until an interpreter could be present, a request which plaintiff's counsel had earlier refused to agree to. At that point plaintiff's counsel agreed that it was futile to proceed without an interpreter. These hours of deposition testimony are almost completely unintelligable. The deposition was resumed the next day with the assistance of an interpreter.

On the following day, Viera became ill and was unable to continue with his deposition. One of plaintiffs' counsel, Nancy Anderson, and defendants' counsel stipulated that Viera's deposition on class issues would be continued to a

mutually agreeable date in the future. Despite the stipulation, on January 3, 1979, plaintiffs' counsel, Judson Miner, informed defendants that he would not produce Viera for the resumption of his deposition. On January 22, 1979, plaintiffs' counsel repeated his refusal. During conversations on February 12, 13, and 14, 1979, plaintiffs' counsel told PCA's counsel that he might produce plaintiff Viera for the continuation of his deposition instead of producing plaintiff Taylor, but PCA refused to waive its right to depose both plaintiffs. Neither Local 130 nor JAC had any opportunity to examine Viera, and PCA had not completed its examination of Viera. Plaintiffs' counsel did not take any action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 30(d) to limit or terminate the examination.

II. Refusals to Answer and Termination of Depositions

A. Refusals to Answer

Hundreds of questions were left unanswered because the plaintiffs being deposed were directed not to answer by their attorneys and whole lines of inquiry were left unasked because plaintiffs' attorneys stated that they would direct their deponents not to answer any questions in particular subject areas. Due to plaintiffs' attorneys' continuous directions to the deponents to refuse to answer relevant deposition questions, the deponents themselves began to refuse to answer questions not to their liking. *See e.g.,* Plummer dep. at 47, 335; Eggleston dep. at 398-400.

At an earlier stage of these proceedings, the court determined that the most efficient way to proceed was for class action discovery and the class action determination to be made prior to discovery on the merits. Nonetheless, the court noted in regard to the interrogatories then at

issue that a fine line could not be drawn between class action discovery and discovery on the merits. The court stated in *Plummer, supra* at 403:

> It should be noted that it is not necessary that the interrogatories relate solely to the class action determination. The mere fact that some of the interrogatories may be relevant to the merits of the case does not mean that they should remain unanswered, so long as they relate to the class issues or are readily calculated to lead to the discovery of information relevant to the class issues.

Plaintiffs' attorneys took upon themselves the judicial role of determining which questions asked by the defendants at the depositions concerned the class action aspects and which questions concerned the merits after the court had set broad guidelines for class discovery. Plaintiffs' attorneys thus limited discovery to what they deemed to be the appropriate limitations and now assert that defendants have been provided with all the discovery they are entitled to. Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition, at 16.

One of plaintiffs' attorneys, Nancy Anderson, succinctly stated the position that plaintiffs' attorneys have taken throughout the depositions:

> It's my responsibility to instruct my client not to answer any questions which I think are improper or not relevant to this deposition. I have made the determination that your questions with respect to Paragraph No. 7 are not relevant to this deposition, and I have instructed him not to answer. Rose dep. at 267.

Although it is entirely proper and necessary for an attorney to object to questions considered improper, it is entirely improper for an attorney to instruct her client not to answer questions considered to be improper or irrelevant absent *extreme* harassment by the examining attorney. If plaintiffs' attorneys thought that the examination of their

clients was oppressive and in bad faith, the proper procedure would have been to move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) to limit or to terminate the examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) unequivocally mandates that at depositions evidence is to be taken subject to the objections. *Shapiro* v. *Freeman*, 38 F.R.D. 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) [hereinafter *Shapiro*]. As the court stated in *Shapiro, supra* at 311:

> It is not the prerogative of counsel, but of the court, to rule on objections. Indeed, if counsel were to rule on the propriety of questions, oral examination would be quickly reduced to an exasperating cycle of answerless inquiries and court orders.

By instructing their clients not to answer 965 questions plaintiffs' attorneys ruled on their own objections. The result was a cycle of answerless inquiries and now, this court order. Plaintiffs' unilateral determination of the propriety of deposition questions without a court order was highly improper and in contravention of the federal rules.

1. Duplication

Plaintiffs contend that many of the refusals to answer were proper because the same subject areas were covered in the answers plaintiffs gave to defendants' interrogatories. Plaintiffs contend that questions in regard to plaintiffs' qualifications, experience, and training and questions relating to the existence, size, and internal conflicts of the class were thus properly the subject of refusals to answer. Plaintiffs further contend that the refusals to answer were proper because defendant PCA insisted on engaging in mindless repetitive questioning and that defendant Local 130 engaged in extensive duplicative questioning.

Deponents cannot refuse to answer deposition questions without moving for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(c)(3) to limit the depositions to matters not covered by the previous interrogatories or without moving pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) to limit the deposition examination. Furthermore, the court has serious doubts whether a protective order would have been necessary absent the presence of such circumstances as the assertion of a privilege, or repetitive questioning following a full examination because neither circumstance was present here. *Compare, In Re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, Pretrial Order No. 54,* 83 F.R.D. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories on the areas subsequently covered by deposition questions were often vague, conclusory, and contradicted when plaintiffs' attorneys allowed their clients to answer. A fuller, deeper probing in depositions of matters previously covered in the interrogatories and depositions is entirely proper especially in the circumstances here where the witnesses are adverse parties and have been evasive and nonresponsive throughout the discovery process. *Worth* v. *Trans World Films,* 11 F.R.D. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). These circumstances are present here where, for example, plaintiff Ivor Taylor in questioning by PCA stated that he knew of about 100 hispanics who tried to become members of Local 130 and in questioning by Local 130 stated that he could not even identify two hispanics who had applied for journeyman membership in Local 130.

As to the alleged repetitive questioning, PCA correctly points out that no repetitious questions on its part are the subject of its motion to compel as plaintiffs admit in their exhibit 14 in stating their grounds for objection to the PCA's questions. As to the alleged duplicative questioning on the part of Local 130, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) does not limit the scope of discovery so as to prevent a party from examining a deponent in the same subject areas as a previous party but with different questions. *New Sanitary*

Towel Supply Inc. v. *Consolidated Laundries Corp.*, 24 F.R.D. 186, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Defendants proceeded properly by conducting their examination sequentially. *Burstin* v. *Slote*, 12 F. R. Serv. 2d 577, 579 (S.D N.Y 1968). In addition, the court finds that defendant Local 130's questions were not duplicative.

2. Class Discovery Questions.

Defendant PCA seeks answers to questions concerning the qualifications, experience, and training of the plaintiffs and the alleged class members and defendant Local 130 seeks answers to questions concerning plaintiffs' skills and qualifications to become journeyman plumbers and plaintiffs' applications to Local 130. Plaintiffs contend that the third amended complaint sets forth ample facts demonstrating that plaintiffs are a part of the class. Plaintiffs further contend that their refusals to answer were proper because these questions relate to the merits rather than to class issues and because acceptance of defendants' position would require a class plaintiff to prove the merits of his claim before he could represent a class. Plaintiffs further contend that because this action challenges the pattern and practice of discrimination in the plumbing trade, the precise qualifications of any plaintiff will be irrelevant to plaintiffs' proof on the merits.

Prior to the completion of most of the depositions, plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification and have continued to demand that the class certification issue be briefed. Plaintiffs' approach seems to have been that no discovery is necessary for class determination so that they may properly refuse to answer numerous questions which are relevant to class certification. To the contrary, it is essential for the court and the parties to have specific information about the class so that there is both understanding of the precise nature of plaintiffs' claim and so that

the class action determination is made "in a practical and realistic way based on an informed understanding of what is actually involved in the litigation." *Gueiting* v. *Taggars*, 62 F.R.D. 405, 406 (D. Idaho 1973). *See also Doctor* v. *Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.*, 540 F.2d 699, 707 (4th Cir. 1976). Previously, this court denied defendants' motions for a more definite statement stating that discovery was the appropriate means of obtaining information about the nature of plaintiffs' claims. *Plummer, supra* at 1144. Thus, the court has determined that discovery concerning the class claims is necessary beyond the complaint.

The questions concerning plaintiffs' qualifications were improperly the subject of refusals to answer because the questions directly concern satisfaction of two of the prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class certification: the presence of a class and plaintiffs who are members of that class. In addition, plaintiffs allege in paragraph 5 of the third amended complaint that one of the questions common to a class is "whether defendants have refused to permit experienced black and hispanic plumbers to take an examination for journeyman status." Because this alleged common question concerns experienced black and hispanic plumbers, the extent of plaintiffs' qualifications and experience is an important inquiry in the determination whether the plaintiffs can represent this class. Inquiry is proper to determine whether the plaintiffs who seek to be class representatives suffered the same injury and possess the same interests as the class sought to be represented. *Miller* v. *Motorola, Inc.*, 76 F.R.D. 516, 518 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, this inquiry is proper even in a pattern and practice law suit. *Garrett* v. *R. J. Reynolds Industries*, 19 FEP 13, 17 (M.D.N.C. 1978). Furthermore, the discovery sought did not require plain-

tiffs to prove the merits of their claim for class certification purposes.

Defendants Local 130 and PCA further seek to compel answers concerning plaintiffs' financial ability, their willingness to finance this litigation, and any agreements among plaintiffs or with their attorneys or any other person concerning the financing of this litigation. Plaintiffs contend that they have already extensively testified in their depositions to their willingness and ability to pay for the costs of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs further contend that inquiry into plaintiffs' willingness and ability to pay for the costs of this lawsuit is moot because the NAACP Legal Defense Fund has recently agreed to pay all costs of this litigation.

Inquiry into the existence or nature of any agreements concerning financing is a relevant issue at this time especially in light of the newly-raised commitment by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to participate in the financing of the lawsuit. This information will help determine whether the named plaintiffs are the real parties in interest and if a class is certified, whether they are suitable as class representatives. *See In re Goldchip Funding Co.*, 61 F.R.D. 592, 595 (M.D. Pa. 1974). Further, at the present time the court has no documentation evidencing the Legal Defense Fund's interest or commitment to this litigation.

Since we have no binding commitment from the Legal Defense Fund to pay plaintiffs' costs, plaintiffs' ability to meet their financial responsibilities, especially if unsuccessful on the merits, is relevant to the class certification issue. *See Chevalier* v. *Baird Savings Association*, 72 F.R.D. 140, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Because there may be any number of reasons why a third party who is not before the court but has agreed to assume costs may nonetheless be unwilling or unable to continue to pay or advance costs, inquiry into a

representative plaintiffs' resources is appropriate prior to class determination.[1] *Rode* v. *Emery Freight Co.*, 76 F.R.D. 229, 232-33 (W.D. Pa. 1977).

Defendant PCA seeks to compel answers to questions concerning the existence, size, and internal conflicts of the class. Plaintiffs respond that the record is replete with detailed answers, so no further inquiry is necessary.

Plaintiffs are incorrect in asserting that the record is complete. In addition, whether further inquiry is necessary is not the issue where plaintiffs improperly refused to answer without seeking a court order. Because the procedure plaintiffs followed was totally improper without a court order limiting the examination, plaintiffs' objections will be overruled.

Defendant PCA also seeks to compel answers to questions concerning the factual basis for allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs properly point out that there are limits upon the detailed knowledge that a class plaintiff needs to have about the factual and legal basis of a complaint. *Hernandez* v. *United Fire Insurance Co.*, 79 F.R.D. 419, 425-27 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Nonetheless, defendant PCA is entitled to answers concerning whether particular allegations of the complaint alleging discrimination are allegations of a particular plaintiff. Because of the multiple plaintiffs and defendants, defendants are entitled to know which plaintiff raises which claim against which defendant.

Throughout the examination of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' attorneys continued to obstruct and frustrate the deposi-

[1] Plaintiff Edell Plummer refused to answer questions concerning the identification of his bank account, unless defendants agreed that the information would not be revealed outside of this lawsuit. Defendants were unwilling to enter into any kind of stipulation in this regard. A stipulation should properly be worked out limiting disclosure of this information for the purposes of this lawsuit only.

tion examinations by advising and instructing the plaintiffs not to answer. The statement the court made in *Shapiro, supra* at 312, concerning plaintiffs' counsel is equally applicable here:

> Rather, he appears to be bent on concealing vital facts or, at best, waging a war of delay, expense, harrassment and frustration. There is no justification for his conduct, no basis at all for his instructing the deponents not to answer. As a result, the cooperative atmosphere envisaged by the federal rules has been poisoned by antagonism.

The depositions here were unnecessarily protracted and resulted in a waste of time in obtaining relevant evidence in areas important to class determination. Plaintiffs' attorneys did not follow the proper procedures contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) for protecting against bad faith discovery practices. *W. R. Grace Co.* v. *Pullman, Inc.*, 74 F.R.D. 80, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1977).

B. Termination of Depositions

This court ordered discovery to proceed expeditiously on the class issues in ruling upon plaintiffs' motion to compel answers to interrogatories. Subsequently, plaintiffs were properly noticed for depositions and appeared for their depositions. The depositions of both Alberto Viera and Josef Eggleston were unilaterally and wilfully terminated resulting in the complete denial of examination of Viera on the part of defendants JAC and Local 130 and of Eggleston on the part of defendant JAC. Defendant PCA also did not complete its examination of Viera and Local 130 did not complete its examination of Eggleston prior to the terminations. The previous order of the court to proceed expeditiously with class discovery and the notice of depositions, having the effect of a court order, *Chagas* v. *United*

States, 369 F.2d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1966), were wilfully violated.

Although plaintiffs contend that the depositions were harassing and a complete waste of time, the discovery rules governing federal practice do not in any way countenance the unilateral termination of the depositions of two plaintiffs by the plaintiffs' attorneys without a court order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d). *Bourgeois* v. *El Paso Natural Gas Co.,* 20 F.R.D. 358 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), *aff'd,* 257 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1958). For plaintiffs' counsel to state, "listen, this is silly," in terminating the Eggleston deposition is not a sufficient reason for the limitation or termination of a properly noticed deposition. Unlike the *Rosenblum* v. *Dingfelder,* 2 F.R.D. 309, 310 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) case, where the deponent was fully examined, the depositions of Viera and Eggleston were not terminated after a full examination by the defendants.

III. Sanctions, Attorney's Conduct, Costs and Conclusion

For wilful failure to make discovery, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides for dismissal with prejudice. *Bollard* v. *Volkswagen of America, Inc.,* 56 F.R.D. 569, 584 (W.D. Mo. 1971). *See also Foss* v. *Gerstein,* 58 F.R.D. 627, 630 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Although this most severe of sanctions must be tempered with discretion, the circumstances present here of the unilateral termination of the depositions of two plaintiffs by the plaintiffs' attorneys justifies the imposition of this sanction. This is especially true because the Eggleston deposition was terminated after numerous refusals to answer questions of Local 130 which were relevant to the class issue. The Viera deposition was terminated with the stipulation by all counsel that the deposition would be continued and then one of plaintiffs' counsel refused to abide by a stipulation entered into by his co-counsel. Accordingly, the

claims of plaintiffs Eggleston and Viera will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) for their flagrant violation of the discovery rules.

As to the remaining plantiffs, their evasive and thwarting conduct is also deserving of the harshest sanction. This is particularly so because plaintiffs are potential representatives of absent parties whose interests may be seriously injured by plaintiffs' irresponsible actions. The plaintiffs cannot undertake to represent a putative class, seeking broad and sweeping relief, and then adopt an attitude of callous indifference to the rules of procedure of this court thereby impeding the progress of orderly adjudication of the claims they present. For this reason, the court will enter a rule on plaintiffs Plummer, Rose, and Taylor to show cause why the entire complaint should not be dismissed with prejudice.

Turning to the conduct of plaintiffs' attorneys, their conduct was obstructive and obnoxious to such a degree that is suggests that they consciously and wilfully disregarded the civil practice rules. Judson Miner, as the only plaintiffs' attorney present at the Plummer deposition advised the witness to refuse to answer 472 questions and conducted 27 conferences with him outside of the presence of opposing counsel and the court reporter. Nancy Anderson, as the only plaintiffs' attorney at the Eggleston deposition, advised the witness to refuse to answer 208 questions. Miner and Anderson were both present during portions of the Taylor deposition. Anderson appears to have been primarily involved in instructing Taylor not to answer, whereas Miner conducted the majority of the 69 conferences with the witness. In Rose's deposition, Miner and Anderson were present on different days of his deposition. Anderson was present at Viera's deposition and when

he became ill, she agreed to produce him for further examination. Miner reneged on this agreement to produce Viera for further deposition. Both Miner and Anderson appear to be responsible for the failure to communicate with defendants concerning the need for interpreters of the Spanish-speaking deponents, Viera and Taylor.

Rule 23 imposes a special obligation of court supervision as to many aspects of class litigation, including the quality and character of counsel's representation of the class. It is well-settled that class action counsel are expected to adhere to the highest standards of professional behavior. This obligation is in the nature of a fiduciary duty that arises at the filing of the class action complaint and continues throughout the litigation. 2 H. Newberg Class Actions, § 2705, at 1172 (1977). Plaintiffs' counsels' conduct as set out above was improper when they limited the scope of deposition examination unilaterally, and ultimately terminated two depositions. Their constant instructing and conferring with the witnesses during the deposition examination demonstrates an attitude of disdain for the orderly conduct of witness examination. Their lack of professional courtesy and obstructive conduct in refusing to respond to the need for Spanish interpreters is, in the court's view, unjustifiable. For these reasons, the court will enter a rule against plaintiffs' counsel, Judson Miner and Nancy Anderson, to explain their unprofessional conduct in the discovery phase of this litigation.

As noted above, plaintiffs' attorneys failed to notify PCA that an interpreter would be necessary for Viera's deposition after PCA's inquiry and they continued to direct PCA to proceed with the deposition, despite the fact that the testimony without an interpreter was unintelligible because Viera understood almost nothing of the questions asked

him. The actions of plaintiffs' attorneys were inexcusable because PCA's inquiry came after they encountered language difficulties in examining Ivor Taylor, another Spanish-speaking plaintiff. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys increased the costs to PCA unreasonably and vexatiously. The court will enter a rule to show cause why they should not be ordered to satisfy personally the excess costs of the examination of Viera without an interpreter. 28 U.S.C. § 1927; *Toledo Metal Wheel Co.* v. *Foyer Brothers & Co.*, 223 F. 350 (6th Cir. 1915).

In addition, because the refusals to answer were entirely improper absent a court order, plaintiffs' opposition to these motions to compel was not substantially justified. The arguments of the parties having been heard, plaintiffs are directed to pay to the moving parties their reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in bringing the motions to compel: Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). *Addington* v. *Mid-American Lines*, 77 F.R.D. 750, 752 (W.D. Mo. 1978).

As to the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, plaintiffs state no grounds for the imposition of sanctions upon defendants. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for sanction will be denied.

For the reasons stated, it is therefore ordered that the motions of defendants to compel discovery and for sanctions shall be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the motion of plaintiffs for sanctions shall be, and the same is, hereby denied.

/s/ EDWIN A. ROBSON
SENIOR JUDGE

November 19, 1979.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, and IVOR TAYLOR, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO JOURNEYMAN PLUMBERS LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U.A., PLUMBING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY, and THE JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, LOCAL NO. 130, U.A., Defendants	No. 77 C 1726 Consolidated with
ISRAEL REYES, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO JOURNEYMAN PLUMBERS LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U. A., PLUMBING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY, and THE JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, LOCAL NO. 130, U.A., Defendants.	No. 79 C 2364

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on the matters of a rule to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed in

77 C 1726, *Plumber, et al.* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Local Union No. 130, et al.*, as to the remaining plaintiffs, Edell Plummer, Hayward Rose and Ivor Taylor, a rule to show cause as to plaintiffs' attorneys, Judson Miner and Nancy Anderson, to explain their unprofessional conduct in the discovery phase of this litigation, a rule to show cause why these attorneys should not bear the excess costs of the Viera deposition taken without an interpreter, and plaintiffs' motion for the court to recuse itself. The court also has before it a rule to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed in 79 C 2364, *Israel Reyes* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Local Union No. 130, U.A., et al.*, for lack of jurisdiction and plaintiffs' motion for the court to recuse itself. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the rule against plaintiffs Plummer, Rose and Taylor will be made final and the complaint will be dismissed. One rule against attorneys Miner and Anderson will be made final and the matter of their conduct referred to the Executive Committee of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The other rule concerning the Viera deposition costs will be vacated. Plaintiffs' Plummer, Rose and Taylor motion for the court to recuse itself will be denied. In the *Reyes* case, the rule to show cause shall be vacated, and the Title VII count of his complaint dismissed. Reyes' motion for the court to recuse itself will be denied.

Facts

The factual background of these varied motions and rules to show cause appears in two previous orders of the court entered on November 19, 1979, in the *Plummer* action and on February 7, 1980, in the *Reyes* action. The facts will not be repeated except as is necessary to explain the instant matters.

Rule to Show Cause Against Plummer, Rose and Taylor

As the court previously noted in its order of November 19, 1979, during the oral depositions of plaintiffs Plummer, Rose and Taylor, these three witnesses refused to answer a total of 715 questions concerning the class action aspects of their complaint. In that order the court noted why plaintiffs' refusals to answer were both substantively and procedurally improper. Further, the court entered a rule against them to show cause why their complaint should not be dismissed based on this improper conduct during their depositions. In response, plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to a further opportunity to appear and answer questions at their depositions because they have not previously been compelled under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) to answer the particular questions defendants propounded. They claim that dismissal is improper except where there has been willful disobedience of a court order or a complete failure to comply with discovery and that neither circumstance is present here. Defendants assert that dismissal is proper under Rules 37(b)2, 37(d) or Rule 41(b).

Rule 37(b)2 provides in relevant part that ". . . if a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, *including* an order made under subdivision (a) [regarding motions by discovering party to compel discovery], the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following [subp. c] . . . dismissing the action or any part thereof . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

The Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied the amendment of Rule 37 in 1970 state that the purpose of this language was to broaden the scope of the Rule "by extending it to include any order to 'provide or permit discovery' including orders for discovery issued under Rules

37(a) and 35." Thus, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the order compelling discovery does not have to be a Rule 37(a) order. Disobedience of an order, whether pursuant to Rule 37(a) or not, and whether written or oral, which notifies the party that compliance must be forthcoming is sufficient basis for imposition of the harshest sanction. *See e.g., Henry* v. *Sneiders,* 490 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir. 1974); *Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre* v. *Allied Artists,* 602 F.2d 1062, 1065 fn. 5 (2d Cir. 1979).

As early as December 19, 1977, the court stated its position on the proper focus of discovery for this purported class action. In denying plaintiffs' motion to permit discovery on the merits in interrogatories and requests to produce documents, the court ruled that discovery on class issues should first proceed but that "any witness deposed on class issues could be interrogated on matters going to the merits so that he need not suffer the inconvenience of being recalled." *Plummer* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumber's* Local Union No. 130, 77 F.R.D. 399, 402 (N.D.Ill. 1977), [hereinafter *Plummer I*].This order merely reiterated the court's prior oral directions to the parties. (Transcript of proceedings, July 22, 1977; and November 11, 1977). The court also stated that concerning the interrogatory answers plaintiffs sought from defendants, the "mere fact that some of the interrogatories may be relevant to the merits of the case does not mean that they should remain unanswered, so long as they relate to the class issues or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information relevant to the class issues." *Plummer I, supra* at 403.

Furthermore, in April, 1978, when denying defendants' motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement, the court stated "[i]f the defendants desire further information about the nature of plaintiffs' claims discovery is the ap-

propriate means for obtaining it, as well as for developing the issues." *Plummer* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130*, 452 F. Supp. 1127, 1144 (N.D.Ill. 1978), [hereinafter *Plummer II*]. On the issue of the sufficiency of the class allegations the court ruled that defendants "[could] ascertain through discovery whether plaintiffs are adequate and typical representatives." *Id.* Thereafter, the parties appeared at status reports on September 19, 1978, October 6, 1978, and January 22, 1979, to inform the court of their progress on the last outstanding class issue discovery, that is, the depositions of the five named plaintiffs. The court continued to admonish the parties to proceed, to cooperate and to work together, *e.g.*, transcript of October 6, 1978, at 7. The parties reported their problems in setting deposition dates on week days, the failure of deponents to complete answers to questions and of the instructions to the witnesses. The court stated that it expected to hear Mr. Miner's comments on his disagreements (Transcript of September 19, 1978, at 5). Finally, the court moved to set a discovery cut-off date and set a date for filing of a pretrial order covering the factual background for the class action determination. (Transcript of January 22, 1979, at 3-7).

In the face of the named plaintiffs' continuing refusals to answer questions concerning class issues on their counsels' instructions as to which questions they considered improper or irrelevant, defendants were forced to bring motions to compel answers. As the court previously found, the refusals to answer were entirely improper absent a protective order from the court and had they brought a motion for a protective order, the court would have denied it because there were insufficient grounds for entering such an order. Moreover, the reasons plaintiffs offered for their conduct were clearly inadequate because of the previous

orders of the court to permit class issues discovery and to permit deposition witness to testify as to class issues. As noted above, the court had previously ordered that examination of a deposition witness should not be limited to class issues when the witness would be inconvenienced by redeposition on merits issues. *Plummer I, supra* at 402. In response to defendants' previous motion to compel discovery, plaintiffs stated that at defendants' insistence they agreed to limit the initial deposition examination of the named plaintiffs to class issues. Thereafter, plaintiffs improperly refused to answer questions they deemed irrelevant to class issues, which amounted to a substantial portion of the defendants' questions. Plaintiffs cannot now claim that they did not understand their obligation to answer the defendants' questions concerning class issues when this court's previous orders as well as Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) mandated their answers. Because dismissal is proper pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)2, it is moot whether dismissal is also proper pursuant to Rules 37(d) and 41(b).

As recently stated by the court in *Cine Forty Second St. Theatre* v. *Allied Artists, supra* at 1068, ". . . compulsion of performance in the particular case at hand is not the sole function of Rule 37 sanctions." A court must weigh the entire record of the case and then impose whatever sanction is necessary to impress upon the noncomplying litigants and most particularly, their attorneys, that the court will not tolerate dilatory tactics, gross professional negligence or fundamental obstinance. *National Hockey League* v. *Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.*, 427 U.S. 629, 642 (1976). As representatives of a purported class, plaintiffs were under a special obligation to cooperate with discovery because discovery from absent class members is ordinarily unavailable. *Dellums* v. *Powell*, 566 F.2d 231,

236 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Dismissal of the action is appropriate here, where the plaintiffs have flouted their clear obligation to answer questions concerning the class issues in this case. This harsh sanction must be applied because of the willful disobedience of the court's prior orders and because it is incumbent upon the court to make it clear that there is no place for this kind of conduct in class action lawsuits. Therefore, the court will make final the rule to show cause against plaintiffs Plummer, Rose and Taylor. The complaint will be dismissed as to all defendants with prejudice.

Rules to Show Cause Entered Against Miner and Anderson

In response to the Court's Memorandum and Order of November 19, 1979, Miner and Anderson have made motions to vacate the rules to explain their unprofessional conduct and to show cause why they should not be ordered to satisfy personally the excess costs of the examination of Veira without an interpreter. They also ask the court to strike the findings of and all references to unprofessional conduct. If these motions are denied, Miner and Anderson additionally move to have the court set the question of their unprofessional conduct for a full evidentiary hearing; to refer the matter to the Executive Committee for assignment to another judge of this district for hearing and; to delay consideration of publication of the opinion until after the conclusion of such evidentiary hearing.

As a preliminary matter, Miner and Anderson concede that this court has the authority and obligation to inquire into the conduct of Miner and Anderson in connection with the Rule 37 motions to compel and the court's Rule 23 authority to supervise class action litigation. Such inquiry is proper both for determination of who must bear costs and attorneys' fees in connection with the Rule 37 motions as well as for assurance that absent members of the purported class are adequately represented by counsel. In this

regard, the standard of conduct to which Miner and Anderson are held is not equivalent to the standard for contemptuous conduct. Clearly, the court has not found that Miner and Anderson exceeded the "outermost limits of nonprejudicial conduct." *United States ex rel. Robson* v. *Oliver,* 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972). However, the court has examined the record before it and concluded that their conduct fell substantially below the level of professional competence expected of attorneys who practice before it, or that required by their fiduciary duty to the absent class members. *Dellums* v. *Powell,* 566 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Such a finding was well within the court's authority to enter under its power to inquiry and supervision attendant to Rules 23 and 37. *See id.; Kiefel* v. *Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc.,* 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968).

Miner and Anderson contend that the court's findings of unprofessional conduct were erroneous and should be vacated. They argue that they properly instructed the five witnesses not to answer a total of 965 questions which they, as counsel, believed to be repetitive, embarrassing, harrassing and irrelevant. They deny that they coached the witnesses when they held 127 conferences with the witnesses outside the presence of opposing counsel and the court reporter. They offer various reasons why their unilateral terminations of the Viera and Eggleston depositions took place, but no explanation for their failure to bring motions to limit or terminate these dispositions.

Miner and Anderson contend that no previous decision in this district or circuit disapproved of the procedure they followed of instructing the witness and requiring the defendants to move to compel answers. In fact, they claim that the practice of instructing the witness is not unprofessional conduct because substantial authorities in-

cluding 4a *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 37.02[8] at 37-32, 37-33 (2d ed. 1978) approve of the procedure. Finally, they contend that many practitioners in this district follow the same procedure, and that since it is a generally accepted custom, it cannot be deemed unprofessional.

As the court pointed out in its previous memorandum and order, Rule 30(c) permits the practice of objecting to questions during depositions but does not permit instruction of the deponent to refuse to answer. Instead, Rule 30(d) sets forth a procedure for the deponent's counsel to move for a limitation or termination of the deposition. The clear terms of the Rule and the many authorities interpreting it should have notified Miner and Anderson that the procedure they adopted was improper. *See Ralston Purina Co.* v. *McFarland*, 550 F.2d (4th Cir. 1977); *United States* v. *Lomar Discount Limited*, 61 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1973); *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 30.59 at 30-109 (2d ed. 1978); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 2113 at 418-420 (1970). The absence of a decision in this district before this court's order that expressly disapproved their procedure should not have led counsel to believe that their conduct was proper where these other authorities made it clear that it was not. *See also* Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Chi. Bar Assoc. Seminar Materials at 46-58, February 27, 1980.

The authorities that Miner and Anderson rely on for the proposition that their procedure is proper are unpersuasive. Professor Moore's comment in connection with the Rule 37(a) motion to compel is as follows:

> If the objection goes merely to admissibility, he [the deponent] must answer the question and his objection will be preserved and ruled upon when and if the deposition is presented. It may be, however, that the deponent believes that the question seeks information

> that is privileged, or that is not relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. In such a case, the deponent's only course is to decline to answer. At this point the examining party has the option of suspending the examination and moving immediately for a court order compelling an answer, or of completing the examination as to other matters and then moving for such an order. 4a *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 37.02[8] at 37-32, 37-33. (2d ed. 1978).

This comment accuratley states that a deponent asked about a privileged matter may refuse to answer to avoid waiver of the privilege. *Preyer* v. *United States Lines, Inc.*, 64 F.R.D. 430, 431 (E.D.Pa. 1973) *aff'd*, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976). As for the procedure to be followed when faced with an irrelevant question, the comment is clearly at odds with Professor Moore's own commentary concerning Rule 30(c) which states that the deponent's objection should be noted and the questions answered. 4a *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 30.59 at 30-109 (2d ed. 1978). The only conceivable explanation for the comment is that it means that a refusal would be proper where the questions were unmistakably beyond the scope of the lawsuit. Such questions may exemplify conduct unreasonably annoying, embarrassing, or oppressive to a party. Where such circumstances appear, a refusal to answer is a proper prelude to immediate application for a protective order under Rule 30(d). *Shapiro* v. *Freeman, supra* at 311-12. Comment, *Refusals to Answer at Oral Deposition:* A "Relevant" Inquiry?" 1979 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 407, 412, 413.

Contrary to their suggestion, the court in *Kamens* v. *Horizon Corporation*, 81 F.R.D. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) did not condone the practice of instructing the witness not to answer. There the court quoted from the above passage from Moore's, took note of the leading cases that explain the proper procedure to be followed, and made the follow-

ing comment on the conduct of plaintiff's counsel at the deposition:

> Although we agree with defendants that there is a great deal of unnecessary obfuscation, delay and argument on [his] part . . . and that such conduct should not be condoned, we do not find that redeposition is an appropriate procedure under the facts presented here—Had we concluded otherwise, we would not hesitate to order a redeposition of the plaintiff or to consider such conduct in assessing the adequacy of plaintiff and her counsel in connection with the motion for class certification.

Id. at 445.

Nor did this court in *In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation*, 83 F.R.D. 132 (N.D.Ill. 1979), approve the procedure Miner and Anderson espouse. This court held that because answers were ultimately obtained, it was moot whether deponents were properly directed not to answer. *Id.* at 135. And the court was critical of counsel who engaged in the practice of instructing his witness not to answer solely on the basis of relevancy and his impression of the proper scope of the issues his witness could be deposed on. *Id.* The court exercised its discretion and decided not to award costs despite the improper conduct. The attorney involved was not an active participant in the case and he had no prior knowledge of how discovery had been conducted in the case. Miner and Anderson mistake the court's leniency in view of the circumstances for "implicit" approval of the practice. Other authorities they rely on demonstrate similar judicial restraint. *See e.g., Foremost Promotions, Inc.* v. *Pabst Brewing Co.*, 15 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. Ill. 1953).

Nor did the court approve the practice of instructing the witness not to answer in 69 C 576, *Jensen* v. *Sachs*. There

the instruction came only after the 19 year old pregnant witness had fully testified, had told her counsel she was tired, was questioned about her lawyer-client relationship when no motion to disqualify counsel had been filed and, finally, had been interrogated in an increasingly loud tone of voice. After three warnings from plaintiff's counsel that he considered defendant's counsel's questioning on the attorney-client relationship improper and harassing because of the tone of voice counsel was using, plaintiff's counsel terminated the deposition. On the defendants' motion to compel, the court found that the questions propounded on the matter of solicitation were not relevant absent a motion for disqualification and a finding that discovery was necessary or proper as the attorney-client relationship. (Transcript of proceedings on June 9, 1969 at 4). The questions clearly sought information as to privileged matters because the inquiry sought to focus on the content of the communications and not merely when and where the communications took place. Defendants' motion to continue the deposition taxing the costs to the plaintiffs was denied. Contrary to Miner and Anderson's contention, the court did not approve the action of plaintiff's counsel in terminating the deposition by walking out. The court stated that this was a matter it would not go into, indicating that because defendants' counsel's line of inquiry had been improper, further examination by him would have to be on motion. The court's refusal to examine plaintiff's counsel's conduct was not an endorsement of the procedure he followed. Even if the court had expressed approval of his conduct, it would not provide a precedent for the circumstances present here because there the instruction and termination of the deposition came after improper inquiry into privileged communications between the witness and her attorney.

The court is also not persuaded that the affidavits submitted in support of the motion to recuse are supportive of their contention that the procedure they followed is customary with trial attorneys in this and other districts. No affidavit submitted suggests that the amount of instruction they gave the witnesses here is considered customary or desirable in surfacing discovery disputes. The court does agree that the procedure Miner and Anderson espouse "makes sense" because it saves considerable court time and it has a good effect on narrowing discovery because defendants chose to move to compel answers to some but not all of their unanswered questions. If counsel had merely noted their objections to the questions as the rules provide, or had asked examining counsel to reformulate the questions and allowed their clients to answer, then the motions to compel might not have been necessary in the first place. On the other hand, based on the nature of counsel's objections to the questions, that is, irrelevancy and repetitiveness to the point of harassment, if counsel had moved for a protective order in the first deposition, then the court could have determined the propriety of the objections and the conduct at the appropriate point. Thus, the discovery could have been completed without the extraordinary acrimony and delay which counsel's instructions fostered. Indeed, the practice of instructing the witness other than for reasons of privilege will inevitably delay completion of a deposition because it tends to leave the deposition incomplete as to the questions the deponent refuses to answer, thereby promoting and filing of motions to compel. For all the foregoing reasons, the court is not persuaded that its previous finding concerning the instructions to witnesses was erroneous. Accordingly, counsel's motion to vacate that finding will be denied.

As for its other findings concerning the witness conferences and the Viera and Eggleston depositions, the court finds that the record of the case fully supports its rulings in all but one regard, and that is the prior knowledge of plaintiffs' attorneys as to Viera's ability to testify in English without the need for an interpreter. At most, the failure to confirm this need amounts to negligence. Negligent conduct cannot form the basis for holding an attorney personally responsible for excess costs that his conduct occasioned. 28 U.S.C. § 1927; *Kiefel* v. *Las Vegas Hacienda,* 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968). Nonetheless, as to all of the other findings, no further opportunity to be heard by way of evidentiary hearing or on the briefs plus the record of the case is required before this court or any other judge. The motion to strike all references to unprofessional conduct in the court's previous opinion will be denied.

Accordingly, the rule entered against Miner and Anderson to explain their unprofessional conduct will be made final. The matter of their conduct will be referred to the Executive Committee of the Northern District of Illinois for appropriate action pursuant to General Local Rule No. 8. The rule to show cause as to the excess costs of the Viera deposition will be vacated.

Motion for the Court to Recuse Itself

In response to the court's order of November 19, 1979, dismissing two plaintiffs and entering rules to show cause against the remaining plaintiffs and their counsel, plaintiffs filed a motion for the court to recuse itself. The motion is legally insufficient on its face. Even if the facts alleged in support of the motion were true, which they are not, the motion fails to allege an extrajudicial source of prejudice, bias or impartiality against plaintiffs or plaintiffs' counsel. As such, it cannot form the basis for recusal

under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). *Davis* v. *Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County*, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975). *See also In re: International Business Machines* Corp., — F.2d —, No. 79-3080 slip op. at 1421, (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1980). Accordingly, the motion will be denied.

Rule to Show Cause and Motion for the Court to Recuse Itself in the Reyes Action

A. Rule to Show Cause

On February 7, 1980, this court ordered Reyes to respond to a rule to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it appeared to the court that insofar as the Title VII count of his complaint was concerned, his action was untimely.

In response, Reyes contends that the court has jurisdiction over his claim because he would be a member of the class action brought by plaintiffs Plummer, Rose, Viera, Taylor and Eggleston in their 77 C 1726 cause. Their complaint, however, is now dismissed in its entirety as to all defendants, therefore, the court cannot entertain Reyes' Title VII claim as a part of that action. Second, Reyes contends that his complaint was timely because he filed within 92 days of his receipt of his right to sue letter, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) grants a three-day enlargement of a filing time when service of the notice is effected by mail. *Tavernis* v. *Beaver Area School District*, 18 EPD § 8863 (W.D.Penn. 1978).

Nonetheless, this court is unpersuaded by the reasoning applied by the *Tavernis* court. As that court stated, "if Congress had wanted to allow an aggrieved party 93 days to file suit, it would have explicitly so stated." *Id.* at p. 5586. In this circuit, the filing periods set by the act are jurisdictional and this court has no authority to enlarge them. *Harris* v. *National Tea Co.*, 454 F. 2d 307 (7th Cir.

1971); *Minor* v. *Lakeview Hospital*, 421 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Wis. 1976), *aff'd*, 18 EPD ¶ 8664 (7th Cir. 1978). Moreover, the Federal Rules clearly cannot be used to enlarge or restrict the substantive rights of the parties, in particular, the statute of limitations periods pplicable to those rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82; 2 *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 6.06[2] (2d ed. 1978). Accordingly, the court is precluded from applying Rule 6(e) in this situation.

Lastly, Reyes contends that the 90-day filing period should be extended in his case because equitable tolling considerations compel such a result. Reyes signature appears on the return receipt for file right-to-sue letter. On that receipt is the postmark date of March 8, 1979, which commenced the ninety-day period for filing his complaint. In April, he contacted his attorney and told him that he did not remember receiving his letter but was interested in pursuing his rights. This communication prompted his attorney to contact the EEOC which responded by letter to counsel dated April 26, 1979. This letter indicated that the right to sue letter had been sent to Reyes as of March 6, 1979. The letter also noted that the EEOC did not show that Reyes had received the right-to-sue letter, there being "no signed receipt for cert. mail yet." Within forty-five days after counsel had received the letter, the complaint was filed. Thereafter, but not before, his attorney was able to examine the EEOC file and discover the existence of the certified mail receipt.

Reyes urges the court to treat the receipt of his right-to-sue letter by his counsel as commencing the 90-day period. If it were to do so, then the complaint would have been timely filed. Alternatively, Reyes asserts that it was the EEOC's negligence in inspecting the file and misinforming his counsel that caused his suit to be filed two days late. Where the erroneous actions of the Commission caused the

aggrieved party's action to lapse, equitable considerations may permit maintenance of an otherwise untimely action provided no prejudice to the defendants has occurred. *Zambuto* v. *American Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 544 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1977); *Page* v. *U.S. Industries, Inc.*, 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977).

Reyes' arguments lose sight of the crucial fact that, fundamentally, his own failure to recall that he received and signed for his right-to-sue letter caused his complaint to be untimely filed. This is not a case where a family member such as a young child signed for the letter and failed to notify his parent of its receipt. *Franks* v. *Bowman*, 495 F.2d 398 (1974), *aff'd*, 423 U.S. 814 (1976). Nor is this a case where the attorney not the charging party was sent the letter so that the filing period must commence with the date of receipt by the attorney. Reyes' attorney's efforts may have been hampered by the EEOC's communication that the receipt was not in the file. Nonetheless, that communication may have been entirely innocent for a number of reasons such as delayed return, filing delays, etc. None of this changes the fact that Reyes himself received the letter, forgot about it and caused his suit to be filed beyond the 90-day filing period. Accordingly, the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Reyes' Title VII count.

Turning finally to Reyes' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it is clear that the allegations are sufficient to charge defendants with purposeful discrimination against him on the basis of race. *Plummer I*, *supra* at 1142 fn. 7. Accordingly, this portion of his complaint will not be dismissed.

B. Motion for Court to Recuse Itself.

For the reasons stated in connection with the similar motion in the *Plummer* action, this motion must be denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, it is therefore ordered that the rule to show cause against plaintiffs Plummer, Rose, and Taylor, shall be and the same is hereby, made final and the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants. The rule against plaintiffs' attorneys Miner and Anderson to explain their conduct will be made final and the matter referred to the Executive Committee for further proceedings. The rule to show cause against them why they should not be taxed with the excess costs of the Viera deposition shall be vacated. The motions for the court to recuse itself in the *Plummer* and *Reyes* action will be denied. The rule to show cause against Reyes will be made final as to the Title VII count of his complaint, leaving his section 1981 claim for relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

/s/ EDWIN A. ROBSON
SENIOR JUDGE

April 17, 1980.

APPENDIX B

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e):

Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge on respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or local agency

(e) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1):

Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person aggrieved; preconditions; procedure; appointment of attorney; payment of fees, costs, or security; intervention; stay of Federal proceedings; action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge; jurisdiction and venue of United States courts; designation of judge to hear and determine case; assignment of case for hearing; expedition of case; appointment of master

(f)(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has be unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the

charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in subsections (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.

Opposition

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Nos. 81-1209, 81-1208, 81-1106

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

CHICAGO JOURNEYMAN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, IVOR TAYLOR, JOSEPH EGGLESTON, and ALBERTO VIERA,

Respondents.

PLUMBING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY,

Petitioner,

v.

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, IVOR TAYLOR, JOSEPH EGGLESTON, and ALBERTO VIERA,

Respondents.

JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE LOCAL NO. 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, IVOR TAYLOR, JOSEPH EGGLESTON, and ALBERTO VIERA,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

CHICAGO JOURNEYMAN PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, IVOR TAYLOR, JOSEPH EGGLESTON, and ALBERTO VIERA,

Respondents.

PLUMBING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY,

Petitioner,

v.

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, IVOR TAYLOR, JOSEPH EGGLESTON, and ALBERTO VIERA,

Respondents.

JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE LOCAL 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, IVOR TAYLOR, JOSEPH EGGLESTON, and ALBERTO VIERA,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI

These petitions arise out of the Court of Appeals' decision in *Eggleston et al.* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Union Local No. 130, U.A., et al.*, 657 F. 2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981). All three petitioners seek certiorari as to the Court of Appeals'

decision reversing the district court's dismissal of the respondents. Petitioner Joint Apprenticeship Committee, Local No. 130, U.A. ("JAC") also seeks certiorari as to the Court of Appeals' ruling that respondent Hayward Rose's EEOC charge conferred jurisdiction over JAC. Respondents will treat these two issues separately in what follows.

I. RESPONSE TO THE PETITIONS ATTACKING THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING REVERSING THE DISMISSAL OF THE FIVE RESPONDENTS

RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case began as a routine class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The five named plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "respondents") allege that the defendants (hereinafter "petitioners") have systematically denied entry into the Chicago area plumbing construction industry to blacks and Hispanics. Petitioners persuaded the district judge to limit initial discovery solely to issues bearing on whether the case should proceed as a class action. After answering two sets of exhaustive interrogatories, each respondent was called to give his deposition on what he knew about whether a class should be certified.

The Depositions. Respondents' depositions, though supposedly limited to class certification issues, consumed at least three full days for each plaintiff, covered 2,600 pages of transcript, and ended in the physical collapse of one of the respondents. The Court of Appeals found, and the petitions for certiorari do not seriously dispute, that these depositions were conducted not for the purpose of developing the facts relating to class certification but for the purpose of a bad-faith "attack by deposition" on the respondents. 657 F. 2d at 901. The extraordinary nature of petitioners' questioning is described at length by the Court of Appeals and need not be repeated here.[1]

[1] As the Court of Appeals expressly noted (657 F.2d at 900), its catalogue of petitioners' abuse of the respondents is only a "brief

(Footnote continued on following page.)

In response to this examination, counsel for respondents took steps to protect their clients. First, counsel instructed them not to answer a large number of abusive questions. Second, counsel interrupted Eggleston's deposition when the abuse of

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(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

sample." A review of respondent Eggleston's 500-page "class issues" deposition may illustrate this point. Eggleston's deposition begins with several pages of examination about his social security number (5-6). There follows an intensive examination on his wife and children, with insinuations about these children's legitimacy (6-8); the notorious examination on whether he had any Caucasian ancestors (10-16); 11 pages of questions on what he does in his job as a janitor (26-36); an inquiry into his employment featuring questions like, "Do you know what it means to apply for a job, Mr. Eggleston?" (44); 19 pages on what he knows about the process in which a previous defendant (the International Union) was dismissed from the suit by stipulation of the parties (80-98); an examination on "what are the requirements of a class action" (106-110); a 40-page inquiry into how Eggleston decided to seek legal help (111-150); 5 more pages on "How can you tell if a person is a Negro" (151-156); a 207-page examination getting, in incredible detail, every fact Eggleston knew on the merits of the case, despite the district court's express order to limit the deposition to class certification issues (173-380); a 25-page interrogation on Eggleston's assets and plans for financing the litigation (380-405); and a 50-page grilling on Eggleston's knowledge of other class members' identities and claims, after he made it clear at the start he had virtually none (441-490). All this was just one defendant's examination. Counsel for defendant Local 130, Julian Schreiber, then took over and began with a 4-page third degree on whether Eggleston was the same Eggleston who had been testifying (in the presence of Mr. Schreiber) for the last three days (490A-493). This was followed by an attempt to administer to Eggleston, in the deposition, the very employment test respondents were attacking in the lawsuit (495-507). It was at this point that respondents' counsel interrupted the deposition, declaring that he was ready to return on a moment's notice for any questioning that complied with the court's order to confine the interrogation to class certification issues.

This summary, which omits hundreds of particularly offensive specific questions, can be repeated, at any desired length, for each of the five depositions.

that particular respondent became intolerable, offering to resume if counsel would confine themselves to class issues as the district court had ordered. Third, after respondent Viera physically collapsed and had to be carried out by medical personnel, counsel declined to produce him for a fourth day of questioning without further order of court.

Neither side brought these disputes in any detail to the attention of the district court during the depositions themselves.[2] After the last deposition was concluded, both sides took these disputes before the district court. The defendants moved to dismiss Eggleston and Viera, asked the court to order the other three respondents to return to answer certain questions, and requested fees and other monetary sanctions. Respondents resisted those motions by calling the district court's attention in tremendous detail to what they considered the most offensive, abusive, and bad-faith deposition tactics in their counsel's experience, and they filed a separate motion for sanctions.

The District Court's Dismissal. Without entering any order compelling the two disputed depositions (Viera's and Eggleston's) to resume, and without having given the slightest prior

[2] The petitions state that the petitioners brought these problems to the district court's attention at various court appearances during the depositions. See, e.g., Plumbing Contractors Association Petition at 4. This is false. Petitioners voiced no complaint whatsoever to the district court during the depositions about any of the measures by respondents' counsel that were later criticized by the district court. Moreover, when the petitioners took these disputes to the district court after the conclusion of the depositions, they made no complaint over the propriety of most of the measures the district court condemned. For example, they never suggested to the district court it was improper to instruct a deponent not to answer; this theory was a *sua sponte* creation of the district court and was explicitly overruled by the Court of Appeals. 657 F. 2d at 902-903. Likewise, petitioners never complained to the district court of the conferences held by counsel with their clients during the depositions; this was again a *sua sponte* creation of the district court.

indication that respondents' counsel had acted inappropriately, the district court dismissed Viera and Eggleston with prejudice. And although no one had moved to dismiss the other respondents, the district court entered a rule to show cause why they should not be dismissed as well. On April 17, 1980, the court rejected these respondents' arguments against such a sanction and dismissed them. No order was entered at any time ordering the cessation of any of the conduct by respondents' counsel that the district court criticized.

The district court based its dismissal on its finding that respondents' counsel were entirely to blame for the deposition disputes. The district court neither quoted, described, nor analyzed a single question out of the hundreds that respondents complained of. Nor did it discuss, even in general terms, the kinds of abuses respondents had brought to its attention. Instead, in a single sentence, *the district court asserted that every question asked by defendants had been proper,* noting that "had [respondents] brought a motion for protective order, the court would have denied it because there were insufficient grounds for entering such an order."[3]

The Court of Appeals' Decision. The Court of Appeals reversed. *Eggleston* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Union,* 657 F. 2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981). First, it found the district court's assessment of all blame against the respondents' counsel, and its total exoneration of petitioners, to be wrong. While criticizing the manner in which respondents' counsel acted to protect their clients, the Court of Appeals spent the greater part of its opinion discussing specific discovery abuses by petitioners' counsel—a discussion that, in length and substance, is unprecedented in the published opinions of any federal court on discovery matters. The Court of Appeals findings of petitioners' misconduct included the following:

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[3] For the quoted language, see the Appendix of the Petition of Plumbing Contractors Association, p. 64a.

1. That petitioners' counsel engaged in a "totally unjustified and reprehensible intrusion into personal family history" by demanding information about an indisputably black respondent's Caucasian ancestors (657 F. 2d at 898);
2. That counsel engaged in "an objectionable effort by [petitioners] to administer some sort of verbal blood test to each [respondent]" (*ibid.* at 899);
3. That "Eggleston and Rose were asked questions some members of the bar might have difficulty answering correctly" (*ibid.* at 899, n.16);
4. That petitioners abused Eggleston with an examination suggestive of a State of Illinois licensing examination (*ibid.* at 899, n.17);
5. That petitioners' questions in many specific cases were "argumentative and senseless," "repetitive, or worse" (19), or demonstrated a "stubborn tendency to insist on valueless answers" (*ibid.* at 899-900);
6. That of the 965 deposition questions that drew instructions not to answer, at least 551 "were not relevant or worth asking in the first place" (*ibid.* at 900-901);
7. That petitioners' attempts to justify their "extensive explorations" were without merit, leaving the panel satisfied that petitioners were "more interested in tactics than in answers" (*ibid.* at 900).

In a devastating summary, the Court of Appeals found:

> The stack of depositions examined by this court exceeds a foot in height and this is supposed to represent discovery solely on the class issue. It is an example of "runaway" discovery which is excessive, burdensome, unnecessary and intrusive. The attack by deposition appears to have been designed for some other purpose than to assist the court in making a class determination.

657 F. 2d at 901.

The Court concluded that the district court had clearly erred in putting all blame, much less the greater part of the blame, on the respondents. It followed that a dismissal sanction based on this erroneous finding was an abuse of discretion. 657 F. 2d at 904.

Second, the Court of Appeals found that particularly in light of the petitioners' misconduct, the district court had abused its discretion in penalizing the respondents and the class with dismissal with prejudice for the conduct of their lawyers. As the Court wrote:

> [I]n this discrimination case the sanctions fall too heavily upon the individual plaintiffs who were not knowledgeable in the ways of the law, as well as on the other putative members of the class they seek to assist. Members of the putative class, knowing of this present ordeal, could not but be discouraged from instituting similar individual undertakings against these defendants. If there is any merit to the charges of discrimination against minorities by those who control the plumbing trade in the Chicago area, then, too, the dismissal sanction rests too heavily upon the public.

657 F. 2d at 904.

CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

The Court of Appeals' decision presents no serious issue, much less one worth the attention of this Court.

A. The Court of Appeals' Decision is Perfectly Consistent With the National Hockey League Case

Petitioners claim the Court of Appeals' decision is contrary to this Court's decision in *National Hockey League* v. *Metropolitan Hockey League,* 427 U. S. 639 (1976). Petitioners wish to make *National Hockey League* a total barrier to appellate review of discovery sanctions. The case will not serve such a

purpose. When, as here, discovery sanctions are founded on flagrantly erroneous findings of fact, nothing in *National Hockey League* insulates such sanctions from reversal.

In *National Hockey League*, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs after they violated a series of orders, extending over fourteen months, to answer crucial interrogatories. The district court's opinion catalogued an amazing history of violated orders, broken commitments, and express warnings to answer or be dismissed. 63 F.R.D. 657 (E. D. Pa. 1974). There was no claim that the defendants or their counsel had done anything improper, much less contributed to the plaintiffs' misconduct. The Court of Appeals reversed this dismissal because it found it too harsh, but the Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. It noted: "Certainly the findings contained in the memorandum opinion of the district court are fully supported by the record." 427 U. S. at 642. Because they were, the Court of Appeals was not free to substitute its own judgment as to the proper sanction for that of the district court.

The present case has nothing in common with *National Hockey League*. Here, the district court dismissed plaintiffs who had violated no prior order whatsoever. And the Court of Appeals found that the district court's principal finding, far from being "amply supported by the record," was entirely contrary to the record. As the Court of Appeals noted, the heart of the district court's dismissal was its finding that petitioners' lawyers had done nothing wrong and that respondents' lawyers bore all the fault for these discovery disputes. No one can credibly deny that this finding was indefensible.

As the lower courts have emphasized, *National Hockey League* cannot be invoked to rubber-stamp a district court's mistaken findings of fact relating to discovery issues. See, e.g., *Wilson* v. *Volkswagen of America*, 561 F. 2d 494, 505-506 (4th Cir. 1977). Instead, the courts have continued to hold that a district court abuses its discretion by placing the blame on one side when it is shared by both. As Judge Friendly put it in

Saylor v. *Basteda,* 623 F. 2d 230, 238-239 (2d Cir. 1980): "In short, there is blame enough here for everyone; it should not all have been laid at the door of plaintiff's present counsel." Likewise, in *Dudley* v. *South Jersey Metal, Inc.,* 555 F. 2d 96 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit reversed a dismissal because "whatever the division of responsibility, defendant must bear some of the blame." 555 F. 2d at 99.

In this case, petitioners do not dispute that the district court was wrong to place exclusive blame on respondents' counsel. Nor do they dispute that the Court of Appeals was right to conclude that "there is more than enough fault for counsel on both sides to share." 657 F. 2d at 902. Not a word in *National Hockey League* tolerates a dismissal with prejudice under such circumstances.

The petitioners, however, make two efforts to straightjacket this case into the mold of *National Hockey League.* First, petitioners claim that the district court "weighed" the petitioners' misconduct, and assigned that misconduct little or no weight. They argue that *National Hockey League* bars a reviewing court from giving its own "weight" to extenuating circumstances once the district court considers them. However, this misrepresents what the district court did. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the district court found that *no misconduct whatsoever by petitioners occurred.* From beginning to end, the district court's opinions contain not the slightest hint of criticism of petitioners' conduct, much less a "weighing" of that misconduct against respondents'. To the contrary, the district court expressly stated that not a single one of petitioners' questions was objectionable, in terms so general that one cannot tell, from reading its opinions, what respondents were complaining about. In short, there was no careful "weighing" of one side's misconduct against another's. Instead there was a finding exonerating petitioners that is clearly and indisputably erroneous.

But even if the district court had considered and "weighed" petitioners' abuses against respondents' counsel's

conduct, nothing in *National Hockey League* could have saved its judgment dismissing the respondents. To be sure, *National Hockey League* cautions courts of review not to reweigh those judgments lightly. But nothing in that case protects a district court who has weighed the evidence in a manner inconsistent with common sense and justice. In this case, no "weighing" of petitioners' bad-faith "attack by deposition" could defensibly minimize that weight to the point of justifying the dismissal of the respondents.

Petitioners' second argument to make this case fit *National Hockey League* is that the abuses by their own lawyers were "unrelated" to the conduct of respondents' counsel that the Court of Appeals criticized. Given the undisputed facts of the deposition disputes, this assertion is silly. The Court of Appeals rightly found precisely the opposite, summarizing the disputes as a "chicken and egg situation." 657 F. 2d at 901. And it went on to state that, without exculpating respondents' counsel, "We have decided to concentrate on the deposition questions as the principal basis for our view of the affair." 657 F. 2d at 901.

National Hockey League rightly affords deference to a district court that has correctly found the facts, weighed them, and imposed considered sanctions. It affords no deference to a district court who has based sanctions on findings of fact at war with the record.

B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held That the District Court Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing Plaintiffs and the Class for the Conduct of Their Lawyers

The Court of Appeals' second basis for reversal was that in the extraordinary circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss these five unschooled plaintiffs and the other members of the class on account of inappropriate conduct by their lawyers.

Petitioners claim that this ruling "creates a special category of [civil rights] cases exempt from discovery rules and sanctions" (PCA Petition, 11). Not a word in the Court of Appeals' opinion supports this idea. Instead, the Court of Appeals followed a uniform body of authority which holds, regardless of the type of case, that in setting Rule 37 discovery sanctions for conduct by counsel, a district court must consider the particular facts of the case before visiting upon a litigant the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice for the conduct of his counsel. See, e.g., *Moreno* v. *Collins,* 362 F. 2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1966); *Edgar* v. *Slaughter,* 548 F. 2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977); *Marshall* v. *Segona,* 621 F. 2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1980); *Carter* v. *City of Memphis,* 636 F. 2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980).

In making such a consideration, it is clearly indispensable to examine the circumstances of the litigants themselves and to ask what reasonably could be expected of them in the situation in which they found themselves. That is all the Court of Appeals did. What rightly swayed it was not the abstract category of the case as a "civil rights case," but the extraordinary facts of this particular case—five unschooled plaintiffs who were faced with a vicious examination of unprecedented character. The Court of Appeals rightly found it repellent to punish these men with dismissal for following the advice of their lawyers as to how to respond to that attack.

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals' result is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in *Link* v. *Wabash Railroad,* 370 U. S. 626 (1962). *Link,* which affirmed a dismissal for want of prosecution, properly rejected a "counsel did it" defense where the plaintiff had done almost nothing to prosecute his case for six years after it was filed. 370 U. S. at 628-629. But *Link* has never been interpreted as an absolute rule that innocent litigants are to be automatically punished for conduct of their lawyers in discovery. Such a rigid rule would be clearly contrary to the discretionary nature of discovery sanctions. In some situations, like *Link,* a lawyer's behavior is

so blatant or continues for so long that his client has no plausible claim to be spared the consequence of this misconduct. In other situations, like *National Hockey League*, the client is a sophisticated corporation that has every reason to know exactly what its lawyer is doing wrong. But the present case involves neither of those situations. It involves five uneducated men who had no way of knowing that the protective measures taken by their lawyers might be viewed as improper. In taking that fact into consideration, as the district court failed to do, the Court of Appeals was only following the law under Rule 37—not carving out a new rule for civil rights cases.

The Seventh Circuit also briefly noted that the district court's ruling penalized not just the five respondents who retained counsel, but also the absent class members, whose interests depend on counsel, but who have no contact with or control over them. For this reason, the Court of Appeals rightly found that the district court's dismissal was unjust toward the class and, if their claims have merit, toward the public.

Petitioners attack this reasoning as carving out a special exception to the discovery rules for class actions. Again, the Court did nothing of the kind. It merely following the long-standing principle that, regardless of the kind of case, a court faced with a discretionary ruling may and should consider the impact of that ruling on the public interest. *Yakus* v. *United States*, 321 U. S. 414, 441-442 (1944). That interest was obviously more closely bound up with the present Title VII class action than it was, say, in a single plaintiff's diversity lawsuit such as *Link*. As this Court has said, the Title VII plaintiff is "the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.'" *Christiansburg Garment Co.* v. *EEOC*, 434 U. S. 412, 418 (1978). And it recently reemphasized the particular impor-

tance of the Title VII class action. *Gulf Oil Co.* v. *Bernard*, ___ U. S. ___, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (1981).[4]

The Seventh Circuit created no "special discovery rules" for civil rights suits. It correctly applied generally applicable rules to the extraordinary facts of this case.

C. The Court of Appeals Could Have Reversed on Numerous Other Grounds

Certiorari is likewise unjustified because the Court of Appeals had numerous alternative grounds for reversal that it expressly found it unnecessary to reach. 657 F. 2d at 908, n. 35. For example:

1. The district court dismissed two respondents (Eggleston and Viera) under Rule 37(d) for "failure to

[4] The petitioners argue that the class is not prejudiced by the dismissal. Petitioners claim that the filing of this class action tolled the statute of limitations for all class members under *American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah*, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Hence, they say, dismissing the five respondents harmed no one in the class. This argument is disingenuous. Title VII named plaintiffs can represent only those class members who could have filed EEOC charges during or after the 300-day period preceding the filing of the named plaintiff's EEOC charge. See, e.g., *Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.*, 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975). The five respondents' EEOC charges dated back to 1975, so that they can represent, at a minimum, all blacks and Hispanics whose claims arose from about 1974 on. However, if they are dismissed, and someone else should file a future class action, he will be unable to represent most of that class, because his EEOC charge will be dated far later than 1975.

As petitioners well know, the *American Pipe* doctrine will not save such class members' claims. That doctrine tolls the time for class members to institute legal proceedings when a class action is filed, but that tolling lasts only until the time it is dismissed or class certification is denied. The district court's dismissal of the five respondents' case started that time running, and if that dismissal were affirmed on appeal, the statute would probably be held to have been running since April 1980, thereby eliminating everyone who was in the class as of that date.

appear" at their depositions. This was erroneous as a matter of law. Both men appeared and submitted to three days of abusive questioning. Both then got into good-faith disputes as to whether further questioning was required unless petitioners obtained a court order. The law is clear that once a deposition begins, such disputes are not governed by Rule 37(d). Instead, petitioners' remedy is to seek a court order requiring the continuation of the depositions. None was sought here. *SEC* v. *Research Automation Corp.*, 521 F. 2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975).

2. The other three respondents were dismissed under Rule 37(b) for "failure to obey an order pertaining to discovery." This was erroneous, because no such order was issued by the court.

3. The district court abused its discretion by dismissing three respondents whom petitioners did not move to dismiss. See *Carter* v. *City of Memphis*, 636 F. 2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980). Likewise, the court abused its discretion by dismissing on the basis of two practices by respondents' counsel—instructing not to answer and conferring with clients during the depositions—to which petitioners did not object during the deposition, and which they never asserted to be improper in their motions to the district court.

Other grounds could be listed. This dismissal was reversible on so many grounds not reached by the Court of Appeals that certiorari will simply waste further time in a case where too much has been wasted.

II. RESPONSE TO THE JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Hayward Rose, without the assistance of counsel, filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on October 28, 1975. The charge formally named petitioner Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Union Local No. 130, U.A. (hereinafter "Local 130"). It stated:

> I have been denied entrance into the plumbers' union because of my race, Black. I was told on 8/12/75 that they were not taking any new apprentices. For the last 14 years they have denied me entrance.

Rose did not know, and could not have been expected to know, that the apprenticeship program is formally administered not by Local 130 but by petitioner Joint Apprenticeship Committee Local No. 130 U.A. (hereinafter "JAC"). JAC, like all joint apprenticeship committees, is a creature of the Taft-Hartley Act. Five of its members are named by petitioner Local 130 and the other five by petitioner Plumbing Contractors Association of Chicago and Cook County (hereinafter "PCA"). 657 F. 2d at 906. Every JAC member named by Local 130 is an officer of Local 130—including Local 130's business manager, its business representative, one of its executive board members, its vice president, and its recording secretary. JAC is run by a coordinator, Peter Diamond, who has been an officer of Local 130 since 1966. JAC's office is the headquarters of Local 130, and its name, "Joint Apprenticeship Committee Local No. 130, U. A.," carries no suggestion that it has any independent legal existence from Local 130.

Eighteen months later, after obtaining counsel experienced in the Chicago construction industry, Rose filed a second charge

with the EEOC. The second charge named JAC, Local 130, and PCA. Rose filed suit in May 1977.

The district court dismissed the Title VII claims against JAC because Rose had not explicitly named it in his 1975 EEOC charge. The court further held that the amended charge was untimely since it was filed more than 180 days after Rose's last application to the apprenticeship program, rejecting Rose's argument that the second charge related back to the date of filing of the first. *Plummer* v. *Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local No. 130,* 452 F. Supp. 1127, 1132-36 (N. D. Ill. 1978).

The Court of Appeals reversed this dismissal. It noted that Rose's first charge clearly complained of exclusion from the apprenticeship program, and that JAC administers the only apprenticeship program of record. The Court concluded that JAC, given its intimate connection with Local 130, "knew or should have known of the EEOC charge" and that its conduct would be subject to EEOC inquiry. 657 F. 2d at 906. The Court also found that the JAC had the opportunity to participate in EEOC conciliation proceedings and that, having avoided that opportunity, it should not be heard to complain. Finally, the Court, noting the history of petitioners' ferocious resistance to this suit, pointed out that the addition of JAC to the conciliation process would have made little if any difference. 657 F. 2d at 907.

CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED ON THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

The Court of Appeals' jurisdictional decision raises no issue of inportance. In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals followed the statute and reached a sound result.

Rose's charge is typical of numerous cases where the plaintiff, through no fault of his own, has not correctly named in his EEOC charge the legal entity charged with discrimination.

but where that entity knows that the respondent is complaining of discriminatory behavior on its part. In such cases, the courts have correctly held that there is neither a statutory bar nor any sensible argument against upholding Title VII jurisdiction against the misnamed party. Contrary to JAC's assertion, there is no conflict among the circuits on this matter, and JAC offers no good reason to change the prevailing rule.

A. Rose's Charge Named JAC Within the Meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)

Title VII allows an aggrieved party to file a civil action "against the respondent named in the charge." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Most charges are filed by persons without the assistance of counsel, and it frequently happens that they do not precisely name the legal entity whose conduct they are complaining of. This is especially likely in cases where the employment process involves more than a single employing company. For example, Rose's case involved no single employer, but rather a collection of companies (PCA), a union, and a hybrid "committee". In such situations, mistakes by lay charging parties are to be expected, and this Court has made it clear that they are not to be penalized by hypertechnical interpretations of Title VII's jurisdictional requirements. *Love* v. *Pullman Co.*, 404 U. S. 522, 527 (1972).

Following the teaching of *Pullman*, the lower courts have adopted a common-sense interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "named in the charge." To satisfy this requirement, a party need not be named by its correct name, and in fact need not be described by name at all in the charge. Instead, a party is "named in the charge" within the meaning of this phrase if it can be reasonably expected to know, from the contents of the charge, that its conduct is being complained of. *Kaplan* v. *International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees*, 525 F. 2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975); *Davis* v. *Weidner*, 596 F. 2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1979); *Shehadeh* v. *Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.*, 595 F. 2d 711, 727-728 (D. C. Cir. 1978).

Rose's charge meets this standard. As the Court of Appeals held, the conduct charged by Rose—exclusion from the apprentice program—by definition was JAC's conduct. JAC had to know that the moment it got notice of the charge. By specifying his exclusion from the apprenticeship program, Rose "named [JAC] in the charge" with all the specificity required under Title VII. He cannot be penalized for his mistake in specifying the legal entity that ran the program. It would have taken a minor miracle for Rose to have understood, as he filed his charge in 1975 without the assistance of counsel, that there existed a legally distinct entity from Local 130 known as the Joint Apprenticeship Committee. A layman like Rose, with no experience in the plumbing construction trade, does not think he is trying to get into a committee when he wants to become an apprentice. Like Rose, he thinks he is trying to get into the union. Even if he had known there was such a thing as the JAC, he had no clue that it was legally different from Local 130. The JAC's headquarters are Local 130's headquarters. Its coordinator is a Local 130 officer. Its name, "Joint Apprenticeship Committee, Local No. 130, U.A.," would not lead even a seasoned lawyer to suspect that it has any legal existence independent from Local 130.

B. There Is No Conflict In The Circuits

JAC claims that the Court of Appeals' decision creates a conflict in the circuits. There is no such conflict. Every circuit to consider this issue has held as the Seventh Circuit did: the Third (*Glus* v. *G.C. Murphy Co.*, 562 F. 2d 880 (3d Cir. 1977)); the Fifth (*Terrell* v. *United States Pipe & Foundry Co.*, 644 F. 2d 1112, 1123-1124 (5th Cir. 1981)); the Ninth (*Kaplan* v. *International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, supra*); the Tenth (*Romero* v. *Union Pacific R.R.*, 615 F. 2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980)); and the District of Columbia (*Shehadeh* v. *Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., supra*).

JAC claims that the Fourth Circuit's early decision in *Mickel* v. *State Employment Service*, 377 F. 2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967) conflicts with the above authorities. There is no such

conflict, because *Mickel* did not raise the "misnamed respondent" issue. In *Mickel*, plaintiff presented herself to the South Carolina State Employment Service seeking job referrals, and indicated that she was interested in a job with Exide Battery Company. The Commission never referred her to Exide, and so she filed an EEOC charge against the Commission. Later she sued both the Commission and Exide. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Exide because it had not been named in the charge. That was obviously correct, because Mickel's EEOC charge had contained nothing to suggest that Exide had done anything to her; it was not alleged even to have known of her existence. Even if Exide had received notice of her charge, it would have had no reason to think its conduct was being complained of.[5]

Nor is there any "conflict," as JAC claims, in the criteria used by the circuits that have upheld jurisdiction over misnamed parties. The various criteria elaborated in these cases all test the same two basic considerations: (1) whether the unnamed party reasonably should have known its conduct was being complained of, and (2) whether the unnamed party has any legitimate reason to complain of not being included in EEOC conciliation proceedings. These are factual determinations that are not susceptible to a rigid set of criteria, as the cases emphasize. See, e.g., *Glus* v. *G.C. Murphy Co., supra*, 562 F. 2d at 888. In making such determinations, it is typical for courts to cite with approval the factors that other circuits have taken into account, as the Seventh Circuit did in this case. There is no "conflict" whatsoever in this process.[6]

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[5] The lack of conflict is further shown by the fact that district courts in the Fourth Circuit routinely allow jurisdiction over unnamed parties if the usual tests are met. See, e.g., *Yerrell v. Maryland State Highway Adm.*, 13 FEP Cases 1746, 1749 (D.Md. 1976); *Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.*, 11 FEP Cases 1290, 1291-1292 (D.N.C. 1973).

[6] JAC's sole specification of "conflict" is to argue that in *Kaplan*,

(Footnote continued on following page.)

C. No Sound Reason Supports JAC's Position

In asking this Court to review the uniform holding of the circuit courts, JAC offers no persuasive reason of policy.

JAC first argues that the decision "automatically injects into Title VII disputes a question regarding the factual adequacy of notice to the unnamed party." JAC Petition, 8. Such questions, however, are nothing new in Title VII cases. For example, courts must often determine if an EEOC charge was sufficient to put a party on notice of the particular acts later complained of in the lawsuit. See, e.g., *Hicks* v. *ABT Associates, Inc.*, 572 F. 2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978); *Jenkins* v. *Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc.*, 538 F. 2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied* 429 U. S. 986 (1976). Any remedy that conditions court jurisdiction on a previous administrative charge will occasionally raise issues of the adequacy of notice. Every federal judge is an expert at disposing of such issues.

Second, JAC claims that it was not notified by the EEOC of Rose's charge, and states that "the decision may well stand for the proposition that notice received from any unofficial source, e.g., a third party or a newspaper, will be sufficient." JAC Petition, 8. The Court of Appeals decision contains nothing to support this worried reading. Its holding was that the JAC received notice of the charge, not through "unofficial sources," but *through the action of the EEOC*. When the EEOC duly forwarded this charge to Local 130, the JAC had to know that Rose was complaining of its conduct.

Third, JAC argues that its trustees must retain undivided loyalty to the JAC "fund," even when they happen also to be officers of Local 130 or PCA. JAC Petition, 10. JAC argues

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(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

supra, the Ninth Circuit dispensed with a requirement that the misnamed party have notice of the charge. JAC Petition at 11-12. The *Kaplan* opinion contains not one word to support this reading. See 525 F.2d at 1358-1359.

that because of this doctrine, Local 130 therefore had no power to conciliate in the EEOC on behalf of JAC. However, the Court of Appeals never stated or implied that Local 130 was required to conduct conciliation on behalf of JAC. The Court merely held that *the JAC itself* had notice of Rose's charge and had an opportunity to conciliate that charge if it wanted. The JAC is so closely tied to Local 130—through overlapping directors, identical headquarters, and mutual intimate involvement with the apprenticeship program—that the JAC itself had to have notice of Rose's charge, so that it had the opportunity to conciliate this charge if it had wanted.

Finally, the JAC claims that under the Court of Appeals decision, an unnamed party will be "forced to intervene" in the EEOC proceedings and thereby subject itself to possible Title VII litigation. JAC Petition, 9. This is wrong. The Court of Appeals decision forces no one to do anything. A party like JAC, whose conduct is clearly complained of in the charge but which is not correctly named as a separate legal entity, has a choice. If it is sincerely interested in conciliating the dispute, it may participate in the EEOC proceedings. If it is not interested, it may remain aloof from the conciliation proceedings, and argue later, if it is sued, that the EEOC charge failed to place it on sufficient notice to support Title VII jurisdiction. If this gamble fails, as it did with JAC, there is no reason to feel sorry for the gambler, because *it based its gamble on its unwillingness to engage in the Title VII conciliation process.* Under such circumstances, as the Court of Appeals held, it cannot be heard to complain that it was deprived of the opportunity to conciliate. 657 F. 2d at 907.

The JAC offers no sound reason for this Court to review the uniform holding of the circuits. Its "right-to-hide" argument is contrary to the purpose of Title VII's conciliation provisions. Those provisions are intended to promote the voluntary settlement of disputes, not to encourage parties to hide from conciliation efforts. JAC, which knew perfectly well

that Hayward Rose had complained to the EEOC of discrimination in an apprenticeship program that it ran, has no claim to sympathy by deliberately turning down the chance of solving this dispute through conciliation rather than in court.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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Petitioner's Reply Brief

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE LOCAL NO. 130, U.A.,

Petitioner,

v.

JOSEF EGGLESTON, ALBERTO VIERA, EDELL PLUMMER, HAYWARD ROSE, and IVOR TAYLOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORANDUM

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PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORANDUM

THE DECISION BELOW IMPROPERLY EXPANDS FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN TITLE VII CASES.

A. The Court's Relaxation Of The Title VII Jurisdictional Requirements Raises Numerous Problems And Questions Affecting Jurisdictional Determinations Under Title VII.

Respondents stretch the Title VII jurisdictional requirements far beyond all reasonable meaning. Nothing in the statute creates the exception which respondents seek to establish. The plain wording permits a lawsuit only against the "respondent named in [an EEOC] charge" [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)], and this language certainly does not mean

that a party ". . . need not be described by name at all in the charge" (Resp. 17). Unlike the requirement concerning the timely filing by the EEOC of a complaint previously lodged with it by the charging party, which was litigated in *Love* v. *Pullman Co.*, 404 U.S. 522 (1972), the requirement here is not hypertechnical; it is fundamental. A layperson like Rose, who by his own admission sought apprenticeship for fourteen years, should be both able and required to name the party allegedly involved (Pet. A.31).

Even assuming that an inqury into the substance of the EEOC charge is relevant, the charge was inadequate to notify JAC of its involvement in this matter.[1] It does not indicate that Rose spoke with JAC personnel regarding the apprenticeship program, and the clear and reasonable inference is that Rose was told by the Local 130 personnel at the time he applied for union membership that no apprenticeship applications would be accepted. It is not surprising, therefore, that Local 130 is the only respondent named in Rose's EEOC charge. Even more importantly, it is not surprising that the EEOC failed to either formally or informally notify JAC of the charge.

The very fact that the parties dispute the adequacy of the charge illustrates the problem which will increasingly face district courts as a result of the decision. Unlike *Hicks* v. *ABT Associates, Inc.*, 572 F.2d 960 (3rd Cir. 1978) and *Jenkins* v. *Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc.*, 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.) *cert. denied*, 429 U.S. 986 (1976), the dispute does not concern the scope of the controversy between parties properly before the court. Rather, it involves a more basic determination of just who is a proper party to

[1] Rose's charge read:

> I have been denied entrance into the plumbers' union because of my race, Black. I was told on 8/12/75 that they were not taking any new apprentices. For the last 14 years they have denied me entrance.

the lawsuit. Inconsistent determinations will result where uniformity and predictability should be the rule. [Compare this case with *Terrell* v. *United States Pipe & Foundary Co.*, 644 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981)].

In arguing that the decision does not create problems regarding the sufficiency of notice, respondents' claim that JAC received notice of the charge "through the action of the EEOC" is highly misleading (Resp. 20). Actually, the EEOC never notified JAC of the charge. Instead, it notified Local 130, the only party named in Rose's first charge. Thus, the question still remains whether notice which may be received through a third party is sufficient under law to predicate Title VII jurisdiction.[2]

Respondents' contention that the decision does not force an unnamed party to intervene before the EEOC carries an unspoken and clearly unwarranted presumption. Respondents' position presumes that the charging party's assertions of discrimination are correct and that the charging party will accept undeniably fair and reasonable accommodations.[3] Based on these erroneous notions, respondents misconceive the gamble which faces an unnamed EEOC respondent as a result of the charging party's failure to name it in a timely charge. Clearly, the unnamed EEOC respondent is not gambling on the mere act of conciliation; indeed, it must compromise and conciliate all the time. Rather, with its own procedural rights under the law as the ante, the

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[2] While similarities between Local 130 and JAC exist, the two are in fact and law different entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 U.S.C. § 186c(5)(B), 6; *NLRB* v. *Amax Coal Co.*, — U.S. —, 69 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981).

[3] Respondents here and the court below have implied that Local 130, the named party, was unwilling to conciliate (Pet. A.36; Resp. 16). Yet the Record does not reveal *any* good faith conciliation efforts by Rose. Unfortunately, those efforts have been assumed without question.

unnamed EEOC respondent must gamble that the charging party will accept its proper and sufficient proofs of lawful conduct or accept its fair offers of accommodation. If this gamble fails, then the unnamed EEOC respondent will have sacrificed its procedural rights under Title VII. The gamble is totally unreasonable, for nothing in Title VII forces an unnamed party to pay such a high price in the name of conciliation.

Attempting to distinguish *NLRB* v. *Amax Coal Co.*, -U.S.-, 69 L. Ed 2d 672 (1981), respondents argue that the court of appeals did not state that Local 130 was required to conciliate on behalf of JAC (Resp. 21). Petitioner has never stated that it did. Rather, petitioner contends the court placed undue emphasis on the failure of Rose and Local 130 to come to terms. Moreover, respondents' statement that JAC had the opportunity to conciliate begs the fundamental issue of whether any responsibility to conciliate devolves on a party not named in a charge.

Petitioner does not argue it has a "right-to-hide" (Resp. 21). Petitioner has trained literally thousands of apprentices in the Chicagoland area, an impossibility if it hid from the public. Rather, petitioner merely insists on strict adherence to the jurisdictional requirements as a prerequisite to a Title VII lawsuit. The protection of the statutory requirements from erosion by the courts will provide, in the final analysis, ". . . the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of law." *Mohasco Corp.* v. *Silver*, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).

B. A Conflict Exists Among Circuit Decisions.

Respondents cannot reconcile the clear conflict among circuit decisions.

Respondents maintain that *Mickel* v. *State Employment Service*, 377 F.2d (4th Cir.) *cert. denied*, 389 U.S. 877 (1967)

does not raise the "misnamed respondent" issue (Resp. 19). Neither does this case. In *Mickel,* plaintiff named in her EEOC charge only one of two parties she attempted to sue in district court. The same is true here. Rose named Local 130 in his charges before the EEOC and in his Title VII lawsuit, and Rose always sought independent relief against it. Thus, Local 130 was not misnamed. Instead, petitioner was simply *unnamed* and, therefore, the conflict remains.

Contrary to respondents' assertion (Resp. 19), the decisions supporting jurisdiction do not rest on similar criteria. In *Terrell* v. *United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,* 644 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981), which respondents virtually ignored, the fifth circuit examined only the scope of the charge and found it so vague that the EEOC did not give even informal notice to the unnamed party. *Id.* at 1124. Such is likewise true here.

An even greater conflict exists between this case and *Kaplan* v. *International Alliance of Theatrical & State Employees & Motion Picture Operators,* 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975), a case which extended jurisdiction in the absence of any evidence that the unnamed party knew of the charge. Although respondents maintain that "[t]he *Kaplan* opinion contains not one word to support this reading" (Resp. 20 n.6), respondents do not point to anything in *Kaplan* demonstrating that the unnamed party had notice or that the court required notice. Thus, *Kaplan* will probably serve as precedent for the proposition that notice to the unnamed party is unnecessary. If not, the D. C. circuit decision in *Shehadeh* v. *Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.,* 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978) certainly will. The court merely examined the language of the charge itself without concern about notice to the unnamed party. The court stated:

> While the Commission's failure actually to furnish notice or initiate conciliation efforts will not bar a civil action by the aggrieved, the Commission must be afforded a reasonable *opportunity* to investigate violations assertedly committed by the defendant.

Id. at 727-28 (emphasis in original). As in *Kaplan*, nothing in *Shehadeh* indicates that the unnamed party received notice of the charge.[4] Under these decisions, unlike the decision here, notice to the unnamed party is unnecessary.

The irreconcilable conflict provides a compelling reason to grant the petition.

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[4] In this light, respondents' citations to *Kaplan* and *Shehadeh* at page 17 are incorrect.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Honorable Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the seventh circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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